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COMMUNITARIANISM AND THE ROBERTS COURT 
ROBERT M. ACKERMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
 In this Article, Professor Ackerman examines the work of the Roberts Court through a 
communitarian lens. Communitarians strive for a reasonable balance between individual 
rights and the collective good. They believe that even in a rights-conscious society, rights have 
limits, and involve responsibilities. And so, communitarians will often consider whether the 
Supreme Court has struck a proper balance between individual liberty and the public interest. 
 But communitarian theory has other, multidimensional aspects. Communitarians view 
people as social animals, who are not mere autonomous agents with nobody to care about 
but themselves. They therefore see the value not only of large-scale communities (such as an 
entire nation) but of smaller, intermediate communities, such as states, labor unions, civic 
organizations, religious congregations, and—at the most intimate level—families. As a con-
sequence, Professor Ackerman asks whether, in cases ranging from Citizens United to Ober-
gefell, the Court has adequately considered the role of intermediate communities—what we 
call “civil society”—in pursuing the good and animating citizens to connect with one another.  
 Finally, Professor Ackerman sees communitarianism as a way to view the world in a 
non-binary manner, thereby breaking down the political barriers that impair our ability to 
reason together and formulate good law and policy. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In the law, the language of individual rights comes easily; the lan-
guage of community is more foreign.1 
 What is “communitarianism”? Why does spell check think it is 
misspelled? And why should one care about a communitarian per-
spective on the Roberts Court? 
 Communitarianism provides a different way to think about legal 
issues. Some leading thinkers wear the communitarian mantle; oth-
ers, without declaring themselves communitarians, have been influ-
enced by communitarian views.2 
 This Article will briefly introduce communitarianism to the unini-
tiated. Without overtly proselytizing, it will introduce the essential 
concepts, at least as they may pertain to constitutional adjudica-
tion. Then it will review the Roberts Court from a communitarian 
perspective and draw out the central lessons. 
 What can we learn from a communitarian perspective? Don’t we 
already have a surplus of perspectives, whether offered by critical 
legal studies, law and economics, dynamic interpretation, textualism, 
or a host of other “isms”? And what if the reader is convinced that she 
is not now nor will ever be a communitarian? 
 There are two answers. First, we gain an understanding when we 
consider alternative perspectives. Those who are not particular fans 
of law and economics, law and literature, or critical theory often ad-
mit (sometimes grudgingly) to benefitting from their insights. Even if 
communitarianism is not universally accepted, what it can teach re-
mains important. Non-communitarians will have a deeper, richer 
understanding of some leading cases and controversies after consid-
ering a communitarian perspective. 
 Second, and even more important, however, is that the communi-
tarian perspective can offer relief from wounds suffered in the tired 
fight between the left and the right, liberals and conserva-
tives. Working through issues from a communitarian perspective 
tends to reduce some of the intellectual hostility that threatens to 
                                                                                                                       
 1. ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE 
CASE OF TORTS 1 (2004). 
 2. Communitarian leanings have been attributed to politicians as diverse as Bill Clin-
ton, Tony Blair, Al Gore, George W. Bush, and John McCain. See RONALD B. MCCABE, CIVIC 
LIBRARIANSHIP: RENEWING THE SOCIAL MISSION OF THE PUBLIC LIBRARY 21 (2001); Dana 
Milbank, Needed: Catchword for Bush Ideology; ‘Communitarianism’ Finds Favor, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 1, 2001, at A1. Communitarian sympathies have also been attributed to the Rev-
erend Dr. Martin Luther King. See Anthony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A 
Communitarian Defense of Black Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959, 1014 (2000). 
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dominate increasing parts of civic life and tends to offer common 
ground. In a time of heightened partisanship and acrimony, people of 
different political stripes have found a common denominator by tak-
ing a communitarian look at matters legal, social, and political.      
 Like most Americans, communitarians wish to strike a reasonable 
balance between individual rights and the collective good. They be-
lieve that even in a rights-conscious society, rights have limits and 
involve concomitant responsibilities.3 One has a right to trial by jury, 
but one has the responsibility to serve on a jury when called upon. 
Citizens have a right to be secure from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion, but railroad engineers must submit to periodic drug test-
ing in deference to the legitimate interests of the community. Com-
munitarians respect basic civil liberties, but fear that the predomi-
nance of “rights talk” in our society has compromised our ability to 
confront societal problems effectively.4 “Communitarians have there-
fore suggested an agenda to advance commonly held social values 
without unduly compromising individual rights.”5  
 The tension between individual rights and the public welfare is 
often at the crux of constitutional litigation and has been the subject 
of comment for some time.6 Communitarians favor neither extreme. 
But communitarian theory has other, perhaps more important, as-
pects. The sociologist Amitai Etzioni has observed, “[a] communitari-
an perspective recognizes both individual human dignity and the so-
cial dimension of human existence.”7 Communitarians view humans 
as social creatures, whose essence is derived not simply as autono-
mous agents with nobody to care for or about but themselves. 
“[W]hether we like it or not, whether we know it or not, we’re deeply 
                                                                                                                       
 3. Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet Re-
sponsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 650 (1995) [hereinafter Ackerman, Tort Law].   
 4. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIS-
COURSE 14 (1991). 
 5. Ackerman, Tort Law, supra note 3, at 650. 
 6. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging 
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1245-46 (1965); George W. Wickersham, The Police Power, 
A Product of the Rule of Reason, 27 HARV. L. REV. 297, 299, 304 (1914); Philip S. Simmons, 
Note, Commercial Builders Revisits Nollan: Constitutional Taking and the Limits of Regu-
latory Exactions, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 937, 938 (1992); see also 12B TEX. JUR. 3D Constitu-
tional Law § 157 (2017) (saying that the individual constitutional rights, specifically First 
Amendment rights, “are not absolute . . . and restrictions upon public speeches and publi-
cations are sometimes necessary for . . . the public safety and welfare”); 16 OHIO JUR. 3D 
Constitutional Law § 325 (2017) (saying the individual’s right to use private property is 
“subservient to the public welfare . . . and when private interests and public welfare con-
flict, the former must give way to the latter”). 
 7. The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, in THE 
ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARIAN READER, at xxv (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1998) [hereinafter Com-
munitarian Platform]. 
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bound up in the social world in which we happen to find ourselves.”8 
Communitarians see the value not only of large-scale communities 
(such as an entire nation) but of smaller, intermediate communities, 
such as states, labor unions, civic organizations, religious congrega-
tions, and—at the most intimate level—families.   
 In his influential book, Bowling Alone, political scientist Robert 
Putnam argued that greater support for these intermediate commu-
nities would be necessary to rebuild America’s fraying social capital.9 
So communitarians try to reinforce the concept of America as a 
“community of communities,” rather than just an amalgam of self-
seeking individuals.10 Says Professor Aderson François, “[T]he right to 
connect with members of a larger community is as deep and innate a 
part of human nature as the right to be left alone.”11 Communitarians 
would like to see greater recognition in our legal system of the value of 
intermediate communities and the desire to connect with others.  
 Finally, communitarians believe that along with rights come re-
sponsibilities and that we should be willing to make short-term sacri-
fices in favor of the long-term welfare of the public. Constraints on 
our behavior to preserve a healthy environment may be seen as a 
prominent example of this philosophy. Only the most short-sighted 
would insist on, say, an absolute right to do whatever one wants with 
one’s property without due regard to the right of future generations 
to live in a world in which breathable air, drinkable water, and a liv-
able climate remain intact. Asking corporate officers to look beyond 
their balance sheets for the current quarter may be another manifes-
tation of this idea.12 
 Constitutional litigation very often involves a contest between in-
dividual rights and a sense of the collective good, as expressed by leg-
                                                                                                                       
 8. DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 31 (1993). 
 9. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL 
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY passim (2000). 
 10. Amitai Etzioni, The Community of Communities, 19 WASH. Q. 127-38 (1996).  
 11. Aderson Bellegarde François, Only Connect: The Right to Community and the 
Individual Liberty Interest in State-Sponsored Racial Integration, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 
985, 1019 (2008). 
 12. I have previously written: 
Communitarians support individual autonomy balanced by social responsibil-
ity, not a complete rejection of the former in favor of the latter. Disputants, like 
anyone else, should make choices based, at least in part, on their interests. 
They should recognize, however, that their long-term interests may well be de-
pendent on the health of the community, that their own well-being may involve 
factors other than economic self-maximization, and that it is in their interests 
to build social capital, even if the immediate payback is not apparent. 
Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Commu-
nity, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 42-43 [hereinafter Ackerman, Disputing Together]. 
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islative or administrative bodies. In the United States of America, 
the crucible for this contest is ultimately the United States Supreme 
Court. What are the rights of an accused defendant when the police 
or government prosecutors take steps to protect citizens from crimi-
nal harm?13 What measures may the government take to restrict an 
individual’s right to own or use firearms?14 Under what circumstanc-
es may the government take private property for public use (and 
might public use include private projects that are deemed to promote 
the perceived public interest)?15 May the states regulate a woman’s 
decision to terminate a pregnancy?16 May the federal government re-
quire individuals and businesses to purchase health insurance?17 
These and other controversies pitting the asserted rights of individu-
als (and defining who may exercise these rights) against the preroga-
tive of the government to protect what it deems the public interest 
occupy if not the greater part of the Supreme Court’s docket, at least 
that part which attracts the greatest public and media attention. And 
well they should, as these matters involve fundamental questions 
regarding the extent of individual rights and the limits of govern-
mental power—both the structural and substantive dimensions of 
rights and powers, the very essence of republican governance.  
 But communitarians will ask additional questions reflecting the 
multilayered composition of our country: Do corporations, unions, and 
other organizations have the same rights as individual citizens, or, for 
that matter, do they have special responsibilities in light of their hav-
ing obtained a charter from the state?18 Are there some rights or re-
sponsibilities that can be claimed and exercised appropriately by in-
termediate communities, such as neighborhoods, political groups, and 
associations, be they private or public,  for-profit or non-profit? Should 
the law recognize the rights of groups, and in particular, historically 
subordinated minority groups? Must we inevitably be locked into a bi-
nary choice between individual rights and government power? Should 
the law be more conscious of responsibilities owed by individuals, 
communities, or the state? Might intermediate communities some-
times play a mediating role in our legal and political discourse?  
                                                                                                                       
 13. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388-89 (2010); Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 136-37 (2009). 
 14. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 15. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005). 
 16. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
 17. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 616-17 (2012). 
 18. See Robert M. Ackerman & Lance Cole, Making Corporate Law More Communi-
tarian: A Proposed Response to the Roberts Court’s Personification of Corporations, 81 
BROOK. L. REV. 895, 899 (2016). 
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 The issues before the Roberts Court, like most of their predeces-
sors, tend to take on a binary form: Which side should be dominant, 
the individual’s assertion of a right or the government’s interest in 
regulating conduct? Placed in such stark light, constitutional schol-
ars tend to line up on the side of either “individual liberty” or “public 
welfare.” Proponents from the left or right characterize their adver-
saries as either “radical libertarians” or “repressive authoritarians,” 
both of which are extremes communitarians wish to avoid.19 The is-
sues often take on a political cast, with Republicans and Democrats 
selectively advocating either individual rights or the public interest 
(depending upon the controversy)20 and with both sides, of late, tend-
ing to think that the opposition has gotten the best of it.21   
 Communitarians, on the other hand, seek a happy balance. 
Somewhere, we believe, there is a “sweet spot” where both individual 
liberty and the public interest can reside together and obtain an ap-
propriate amount of protection. We believe (perhaps naively) in the 
possibility of formulating policy that provides for the maximum pro-
tection of the public consistent with individual rights. While the 
courts are not always the most adept crucible for the formulation of 
                                                                                                                       
 19. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE 
COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 15 (1993) [hereinafter ETZIONI, SPIRIT].   
 20. Often this appears to be a matter of political dogma, rather than principled argu-
ment.  Republicans tend to assert a “right” against government regulation of business 
while refusing to recognize a woman’s right to control her own body. Compare Restoring the 
American Dream—A Competitive America, GOP: REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, https://gop.com/ 
platform/restoring-the-american-dream/ [https://perma.cc/URU9-U3UX] (last visited Jan. 12, 
2018), with A Rebirth of Constitutional Government—The Fifth Amendment: Protecting 
Human Life, GOP: REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, https://gop.com/platform/we-the-people/ 
[https://perma.cc/AK4J-MWFG] (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). Democrats tend to recognize a 
“right to life” for convicted murderers facing capital punishment but not for the innocent 
unborn. Compare The 2016 Democratic Platform—Securing Reproductive Health, Rights, 
and Justice, DEMOCRATS: PARTY PLATFORM, https://www.democrats.org/party-platform# 
reproductive-health [https://perma.cc/B9BL-VCQE] (last visited Jan. 12, 2018), with The 2016 
Democratic Platform—Reforming our Criminal Justice System, DEMOCRATS: PARTY PLAT-
FORM, https://www.democrats.org/party-platform#criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/MF55-
X3W2] (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 21. E.g., Sahil Kapur, Ted Cruz Vows to Put Hard-Core Conservatives on Supreme 
Court, BLOOMBERG POL. (Dec. 2, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/ 
articles/2015-12-02/ted-cruz-vows-to-put-hard-core-conservatives-on-the-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/E67C-GCMF] (reporting statement by Senator Ted Cruz that Democratic 
appointees to the Supreme Court remain consistently liberal, while some Republican ap-
pointees to the Court defected from conservative viewpoints); Democratic National Conven-
tion, Day 1, C-SPAN (July 25, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?412845-1/michelle-obama-
bernie-sanders-address-democratic-national-convention [https://perma.cc/6N3V-MVQ3] (not-
ing on the first day of the 2016 Democratic National Convention, the Democratic Party 
pledged to overturn the Supreme Court’s controversial Citizens United decision). For a 
description of the psychological phenomenon in which each side thinks it is at a disad-
vantage, see Shai Davidai & Thomas Gilovich, The Headwinds/Tailwinds Asymmetry: An 
Availability Bias in Assessments of Barriers and Blessings, 111 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 835 (2016). 
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such policy, we encourage judicial deference to such efforts when un-
dertaken by the legislative or executive branches of the government. 
The leader of what might be called “American political communitari-
anism,” Amitai Etzioni, has lamented that in the United States, the 
pendulum has swung too far in the direction of individual rights, to 
the detriment of the public good.22 But Etzioni, a Holocaust survivor, 
is also quick to caution against the “repressive authoritarianism” of 
regimes such as the People’s Republic of China and North Korea.23 
And those of us in the dispute resolution community wonder whether 
there are instances that are amenable to win-win solutions through 
which we can maximize public benefit without injury to important 
individual rights. Additionally, we wonder whether sometimes the 
assertions of “rights” or “principles” are bloated assertions of what 
are really interests, the reconciliation of which might advance the 
public good.24  
 We should make certain things clear at the outset. The brand of 
communitarianism to which I subscribe is neither at war nor total 
peace with liberalism. While it embraces liberal democratic princi-
ples, it is not liberalism per se. It does not subscribe to the view that 
government is all-wise, all-knowing, and always benign, nor does it 
adopt the Rawlsian view that maximum freedom for the individual is 
the ideal state.25 And while we honor ancestral communities, we re-
ject altogether the reactionary notion that blood ties relegate us to a 
life of hidebound tradition and out-group antagonism.   
 Why this matters. Why is a communitarian critique of the Su-
preme Court important or even relevant? First, allow me to state the 
obvious. It is the Constitution, and not a communitarian (or any oth-
er) philosophy, that must be the lodestar for its own interpretation. 
We cannot impose a communitarian ethos in lieu of the Constitution, 
nor do I advocate that we do so, at least in the absence of an occa-
sional amendment (perhaps, e.g., an amendment upending the Citi-
zens United26 and Buckley27 decisions and allowing statutory regula-
                                                                                                                       
 22. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 26. 
 23. Robert M. Ackerman, Taking Responsibility, 4 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 57 (2008); 
see also Communitarian Platform, supra note 7, at xxvi-ii. 
 24. See GLENDON, supra note 4, at x-xi; BERNARD S. MAYER, THE CONFLICT PARADOX: 
SEVEN DILEMMAS AT THE CORE OF DISPUTES 131-166 (2015).  
 25. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (rev. ed. 1999) (“[A] society satisfying 
the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary 
scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under 
circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members are autonomous and the obligations 
they recognize self-imposed.”). 
 26. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
 27. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976). 
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tion of political spending28) to reflect communitarian norms. The lan-
guage of the Constitution itself must be the primary basis for what is, 
after all, constitutional interpretation. Even the Supreme Court’s 
forays into statutory interpretation must proceed under a constitu-
tional structure under which the legislature has the first (if not the 
last) word. 
 But as Professor Geoffrey Hazard has noted, “A judge can resolve 
an issue of law only by reference, implicit or explicit, to something 
more than the text of the law itself; if the issue was plain there would 
be nothing for the judge to decide.”29 We have certainly seen through-
out our history varying interpretations of the Constitution and stat-
utes based on philosophies of interpretation and political prefer-
ences.30 And (at the risk of indulging in cynicism) even overarching 
philosophies expressed by members of the Court (e.g., “strict con-
structionism,” “textualism,” “structuralism,” “interpretivism,” “dy-
                                                                                                                       
 28. I say “perhaps,” because such an amendment would alter the First Amendment (or 
at least the Court’s interpretation of it) for the first time. That, like a flag-burning amend-
ment or an amendment making it easier for Donald Trump to sue The New York Times for 
defamation (which Mr. Trump apparently advocated until he was reminded that he might 
more often appear on the right side of the “v” in such cases), is not a change to be taken 
lightly. See Hadas Gold, Donald Trump: We’re Going To ‘Open up’ Libel Laws, POLITICO 
(Feb. 26, 2016, 2:31 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/02/donald-trump-libel-
laws-219866 [https://perma.cc/J7KJ-TNAC] (reporting Mr. Trump advocated changing libel 
law so he would have an easier time suing news organizations); Donald Trump’s New York 
Times Interview: Full Transcript, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/11/23/us/politics/trump-new-york-times-interview-transcript.html (noting that in an 
interview with The New York Times shortly after the 2016 Presidential Election, Mr. 
Trump said he rethought about “opening up” libel law after being reminded that he might 
be sued a lot more). 
 29. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Communitarian Ethics and Legal Justification, 59 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 721, 723-24 (1988). 
 30. E.g., Originalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The doctrine that 
words of a legal instrument are to be given the meanings they had when they were adopt-
ed; . . . the canon that a legal text should be interpreted through the historical ascertain-
ment of the meaning that it would have conveyed to a fully informed observer at the time 
when the text first took effect.”); Textualism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“The doctrine that the words of a governing text are of paramount concern and that what 
they fairly convey in their context is what the text means.”); Strict Constructionism, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The doctrinal view of judicial construction hold-
ing that judges should interpret a document or statute . . . according to its literal terms, 
without looking to other sources to ascertain the meaning.”); Interpretivism, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The doctrinal view that the only norms in constitutional ad-
judication are those stated or closely inferable from the text, and that it cannot be left to 
the judiciary to give moral content from age to age to such concepts as ‘fundamental liber-
ties,’ ‘fair procedure,’ and ‘decency.’ ”); Dynamic Interpretation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (“An interpretation based on a consideration of evolving societal, legal, and 
constitutional circumstances or needs as time has passed since the creation or adoption of a 
governing text.”). 
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namic interpretation”) seem to melt away when they interfere with a 
preferred outcome.31 
 Even the most devout originalist cannot claim that the Founders 
anticipated every instance of interpretation on which the Constitu-
tion would be brought to bear. “[T]he possibilities for creative inter-
pretation in American law are such that every American lawyer car-
ries new law in his pen,” says Professor Hazard.32 There exist any 
number of gaps, any number of opportunities for interpretation that 
do not readily avail themselves of a single, predetermined outcome. 
And it is here that a Justice’s philosophy must of necessity be 
brought to bear.33 
 In this Article, I will try to explain why our nation and its citizens 
may be served by employing a communitarian philosophy in constitu-
tional adjudication. In a time of deep division and heightened parti-
sanship, we are best served by a fundamental law that establishes 
and nourishes republican institutions, balances individual rights 
with the public welfare, invites individual and collective responsibil-
ity, and allows a community of communities to flourish. These pre-
cepts allow the best civic instincts and morals of our society to thrive. 
 We cannot deceive ourselves to think that the Supreme Court is 
nonpolitical; the Justices are conscious of the political implications of 
many of their decisions.34 But the judiciary remains the least political 
                                                                                                                       
 31. The late Justice Antonin Scalia’s textualist philosophy receded when he indulged 
in interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act that departed significantly from its plain 
language. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding 
that the Federal Arbitration Act’s exception of “contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” 
did not apply to general employment contracts (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000))). Justice Thur-
good Marshall forthrightly admitted to an activist view of his role: 
We cannot play ostrich. . . . In the chill climate in which we live, we must go 
against the prevailing wind. We must dissent from the indifference. We must 
dissent from the apathy. We must dissent from the fear, the hatred and the 
mistrust. We must dissent from a nation that has buried its head in the sand, 
waiting in vain for the needs of its poor, its elderly, and its sick to disappear 
and just blow away. We must dissent from a government that has left its young 
without jobs, education or hope. We must dissent from the poverty of vision and 
the absence of moral leadership. We must dissent because America can do bet-
ter, because America has no choice but to do better. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Acceptance Speech of the Medal of Liberty at Independence 
Hall, Philadelphia, PA (July 4, 1992). 
 32. Hazard, supra note 29, at 724. 
 33. See Richard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant? The Case Against Strict Con-
structionism, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23, 24; Jack B. Weinstein, Every Day Is a 
Good Day for a Judge to Lay Down His Professional Life for Justice, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
131, 131-32 (2004).  
 34. It used to be said that the Supreme Court reads the election returns. FINLEY PE-
TER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901) (“[N]o matther whether th’ constitution 
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of the three branches, and lifetime appointments have the long-term 
tendency of allowing the Justices to take the long view and work at 
some remove from the fray. The Court, therefore, stands as the most 
prominent articulator of a national ethos, reminding us (and genera-
tions to come) of the principles on which our nation is based.35 With 
all the buffeting of left and right, throughout all the shrill calls to 
populism, authoritarianism, nativism, libertarianism, or whatever 
“ism” strikes our fancy, the center must hold. Communitarianism is, 
among other things, an effort to define and hold that center. 
 Answering the critics. A critic of these efforts might see them as no 
more than the use of communitarianism (or a conception thereof) as a 
theoretical justification for a series of policy preferences along a line-
ar scale ranging from individual rights maximization on one end to 
Benthamite utilitarianism36 on the other. Put a different way, is 
there anything about communitarianism that would cause one to re-
consider one’s own policy preferences in constitutional adjudication? 
 My answer is twofold: First, communitarians prefer not to see 
the world in binary form, i.e., as a one-dimensional continuum rang-
ing from individual rights maximization on one end to public wel-
fare maximization on the other. The possibility that rights entail 
responsibilities plays a role in our formulation. So do the potential 
roles of intermediate communities in defining the landscape. Spa-
tially, then, the communitarian graph exists in at least two and 
probably three dimensions. 
 Second, communitarian considerations have caused many people, 
myself included, to reconsider our own policy preferences. What at 
one time may have been a reflexive response to constitutional issues 
can be leavened by the types of considerations addressed in this Arti-
cle. And a communitarian framework can prove valuable as we seek 
common ground with others who have different political leanings, or 
who are approaching some of these issues for the first time. I hope 
                                                                                                                  
follows th’ flag or not, th’ supreme coort follows th’ iliction returns.”). With the decision in 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam), we might now say that the Court writes 
the election returns. 
 35. Justice Anthony Kennedy, who frequently wields the deciding vote on the Roberts 
Court, often finds himself in the position of articulating our nation’s essential values. See, 
e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). As a colleague of mine says, “It’s 
Anthony Kennedy’s world; we just live in it.” The wit and wisdom of Professor Jonathan 
Weinberg, circa 2015. 
 36. Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism asserts that the value of human action can be 
determined by the amount of happiness it produces. The goal, he argues, is not just to pur-
sue actions in our personal lives that maximize pleasure and minimize pain, but also to 
take actions that yield the greatest good for the greatest number. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1-5 (London, W. Pickering 
1823). 
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those who read this Article will also have reason to reexamine their 
preferences in light of communitarian criteria. 
 The plan of this Article. I began work on this Article under the 
premise (based largely on cases such as Heller37 and Parents In-
volved38) that the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts 
was perhaps the most anti-communitarian Court since the New Deal. 
More careful study has disabused me of that proposition. The Court’s 
work is more nuanced and does not avail itself of such a broad-brush 
label.39 Certain cases have both communitarian and anti-
communitarian elements. The much-maligned Citizens United deci-
sion, for example, overturned a portion of a statutory scheme that 
was a careful calibration of rights in the pursuit of the public welfare 
(a fundamental communitarian principle),40 a scheme consistent with 
communitarian hostility to an election system dominated by a mon-
eyed oligarchy.41 But Citizens United also recognized the importance 
of intermediate communities such as corporations and unions, seeing 
them as potent instruments for the expression of political opinion.42 
                                                                                                                       
 37. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580-81 (2008) (holding that the Sec-
ond Amendment guarantees individuals the right to bear arms, even for purposes unrelat-
ed to service in a militia). 
 38. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710-11 
(2007) (holding that a Seattle school district’s use of race in assigning students to school to 
create racial balance did not advance a compelling government interest, and was not nar-
rowly tailored, as it used race as the sole factor in determining school assignments). 
 39. The approach of this Article is neither empirical nor comprehensive. Despite the 
temptation, any effort to explore the communitarian implications of the entirety of Roberts 
Court decisions would be unwieldy and would, in the end, produce too many trees to identi-
fy the forest. And I have decided against empirical analysis because (1) communitarianism 
is a centrist philosophy that is too subjective and nuanced to lend itself to measurement or 
use of a scale and (2) the communitarian enterprise tries not to view matters in binary 
form. See MAYER, supra note 24, at 17 (rejecting the notion that conflict must always be 
addressed in binary fashion). 
 40. See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Communitarian Platform, supra note 7, at xxxiii (“To establish conditions 
under which elected officials will be able to respond to the public interest, to the genuine 
needs of all citizens, and to their own consciences requires that the role of private money in 
public life be reduced as much as possible.”); Ackerman & Cole, supra note 18, at 983 (ob-
serving that many communitarians regard the Citizens United decision, where “a  
statute . . . designed to level the playing field and promote fair elections, was struck down 
in favor of a corporation’s ‘right’ to influence elections,” as “a step backward”). 
 42. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that “the individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in association 
with other individual persons,” and comparing corporate speech to speech of the Republi-
can or Democratic Party—“the speech of many individual Americans, who have associated 
in a common cause, giving the leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf”) 
(emphasis omitted); Ackerman & Cole, supra note 18, at 987 (“[T]he Citizens United deci-
sion might be viewed . . . as an assertion of the rights of the collective, as expressed 
through an intermediate community (i.e., the corporation or union).”).  
 Another example: Professor Etzioni’s reaction to Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469 (2005), was to regard it with horror, because it allowed takings jurisprudence to take 
 
70  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:59 
 
Perhaps only one or two cases each term can be clearly viewed as pro- 
or anti-communitarian, and we will attempt to draw attention to 
these. But communitarians, as often as not, deal in shades of gray, 
not stark black and white.   
 Part II of this Article briefly describes communitarian theory and 
suggests some core communitarian principles relevant to constitu-
tional adjudication. In Part III, I try to bring these principles to bear 
in the consideration of about twenty cases decided by the Roberts 
Court. Most of these will be recognized among the Court’s leading 
cases, but a few will have been selected because they are particularly 
demonstrative of communitarian (or anti-communitarian) principles. 
This is the main body of this Article. The Article concludes by dis-
cussing, in Part IV, the centrality of the Court in articulating cultur-
al norms and identifying and holding the middle. 
 A personal note. Throughout this Article, I have tried to resist the 
inclination to equate communitarianism with my own outcome prefer-
ences.43 I began work on this Article during the summer of 2016, a con-
tentious time in which our nation was rocked by terrorist attacks at 
home and abroad, shootings of and by police officers, and a most divi-
sive political campaign. I am finishing this Article approximately a 
year after Donald J. Trump was sworn in as our nation’s 45th Presi-
dent. At the time of Trump’s inauguration, we had concluded a year in 
which the Supreme Court was short-handed because a Republican 
Senate was unwilling to even hold hearings on the nominee of a Demo-
cratic President with ten months remaining in his term. At times, the 
writing of an article advocating a moderate and accommodating ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation has felt like a futile endeavor 
                                                                                                                  
on a “Reverse Robin Hood” effect, potentially disrupting established communities (e.g., 
Detroit’s Poletown) in favor of entities that were able to persuade public officials that their 
private interests were in the public interest. See Amitai Etzioni, States to the Rescue,  
NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 19, 2005), https://www2.gwu.edu/~ccps/etzioni/documents/A339-
KELOvsNewLondon.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH3C-DTGM]. My analysis of Kelo is quite the 
contrary, as the decision allows for the assembly of large tracts for redevelopment that will 
help the community at large. See John E. Mogk, Eminent Domain and the “Public Use”: 
Michigan Supreme Court Legislates an Unprecedented Overruling of Poletown in County of 
Wayne v. Hathcock, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1331, 1368 (2005) (“Clarification and judicious en-
forcement of the Poletown principles within the bounds of Michigan takings jurisprudence 
would have provided the proper balance between the rights of property owners whose land 
is being taken and the good of the community in which the property is located.”). 
 43. For the sake of full disclosure, I will confess to being a lifelong Democrat whose 
policy preferences usually (but not always) lie a little to the left of the American center, but 
such conventional typecasting is something most communitarians are inclined to reject. My 
fellow communitarians include my sometimes coauthor, Professor Robert Cochran, and 
other conservatives such as Professors Mary Ann Glendon and Thomas Shaffer. And so, as 
I write, I like to think of these good people sitting on my shoulder, reminding me that this 
Article should not read as liberal screed. And I hope that my friends in the ACLU do not 
revoke my membership because I sometimes depart from civil libertarian orthodoxy.  
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amidst shrill appeals to nativism and a crescendo of populist authori-
tarianism on both a national and international level. The White 
House’s current occupant may be the most anti-communitarian Presi-
dent in recent memory,44 and I sometimes wonder whether the com-
munitarian philosophy has run its course. But I have resolved that 
against this recent history, the need for a communitarian viewpoint 
resounds more strongly than ever. A communitarian approach to con-
stitutional adjudication can be a principled way for us to find common 
ground and begin to heal a divided nation.  
II.   COMMUNITARIANISM IN THE CONTEXT OF  
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
 In his definitive book, The Spirit of Community, Professor Amitai 
Etzioni described communitarianism as “a social movement aim[ed] 
at shoring up the moral, social, and political environment.”45 In pur-
suing this goal, communitarians try to find a sane middle ground be-
tween the extremes of authoritarianism and libertarianism. This is a 
task often undertaken by the courts (and the United States Supreme 
Court, in particular) as they apply the United States Constitution to 
resolve controversies pitting claims of individual rights against the 
perceived general welfare. 
 Communitarianism is often set up in contradistinction to the 
Lockean or “Enlightenment” view that “place[s] individual liberty and 
autonomy at the center of the political universe.”46 This Enlightenment 
view is prominent not only in the work of John Locke but also that of 
                                                                                                                       
 44. Communitarians are unlikely to declare, “I alone can fix it.” Karen Tumulty & 
David Nakamura, Donald Trump Vowed, ‘I Alone Can Fix It.’ But He Discovers Power Has 
Limits, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017) (quoting Donald Trump, Acceptance Speech at the Re-
publican National Convention (July 21, 2016)), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
trump-vowed-i-alone-can-fix-it-but-he-discovers-power-has-limits/2017/02/05/6e323320-
ebc4-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html?utm_term=.9cf6f67d1f34 [https://perma.cc/8LKW-
SNZ8]. Nor are they likely to engage in what one United States Senator has described as 
“four strategies used by authoritarian leaders from time immemorial to consolidate power,” 
163 CONG. REC. S1909 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2017) (statement of Sen. Merkley), or to speak in 
terms of “my military,” Tessa Berenson, Former Defense Secretary Criticizes President 
Trump for Saying ‘My Military’, TIME (Apr. 14, 2017) (quoting President Donald Trump, 
Press Conference (Apr. 13, 2017)), http://time.com/4739810/donald-trump-leon-panetta-
military/ [https://perma.cc/5BGE-T4JL]. 
 45. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 247.  
 46. François, supra note 11, at 1000. See IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: 
‘This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice’, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRIT-
ING 61 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1970) (1793); JOHN 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 271 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (1690); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1991) (1859). Professor François provides a good description of the inter-
play between the Lockean view of individual liberty and communitarianism. See François, 
supra note 11, at 1000. 
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John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant and features prominently in the 
philosophy underlying the Constitution.47 Certainly “the Constitution 
embodied ‘a philosophy of government, that was highly protective of 
individual liberty and manifestly Lockean.’ ”48 The checks on state 
power, found most prominently in the Bill of Rights but also included 
in the structural constraints of the original Constitution, have the pro-
tection of individual rights at their core. 
 An extreme conception of individual rights “by necessity rejects 
the argument that the rights of the individual ought to suffer any 
limit purely for the benefit of the group.”49 Professor Ronald Dworkin 
has said, “The prospect of utilitarian gains cannot justify preventing 
a man from doing what he has a right to do.”50 This can become ra-
ther tautological and extreme: By asserting a mere claim as a right, 
that claim might now, by definition, blot out all that comes in its path. 
 Several commentators have depicted communitarianism as the yin 
to the yang of the “liberal” concept of individual rights. Professor 
François, for example, states, “In the face of liberalism’s radical con-
ception of the primacy of the individual and individual rights, com-
munitarianism stands in stark contrast and describes a set of ideas, 
the foundation of which relies on the tenets of community, moral ed-
ucation, and shared values.”51 Like Professor Etzioni, I am disin-
clined to view communitarianism in such binary terms. While Etzioni 
would argue that in the United States the “individual rights” view 
has obtained too much primacy, he would readily concede that this is 
not universally the case, and that there are other cultures (e.g., to-
day’s Turkey, Venezuela, and, to cite an extreme case, North Korea) 
where the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of autocracy 
or even totalitarianism.52   
 And so, Etzioni’s four-point communitarian agenda (outlined two 
decades ago) emphasizes the need to obtain a balance between rights 
and responsibilities.53 His first point calls for a moratorium on the 
“manufacturing of new rights,” because “[t]he incessant issuance of 
                                                                                                                       
 47. See KANT, supra note 46, at 14; LOCKE, supra note 46, at 271.   
 48. François, supra note 11, at 1004 (citing Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contract and 
the “Political Economy” of Lochner v. New York, 1 N.Y.U.  J.L. & LIBERTY 515, 535 (2005)). 
 49. Id. at 1006. 
 50. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193 (1977). 
 51. François, supra note 11, at 1008; see also BEAU BRESLIN, THE COMMUNITARIAN CON-
STITUTION 39 (2004); Charles Taylor, Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation 
in Late Twentieth Century Canada, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIETY IN 
CANADA 183, 209 (1985).  
 52. See Amitai Etzioni, Communitarianism, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNITY: FROM 
THE VILLAGE TO THE VIRTUAL WORLD 224-28 (Karen Christensen & David Levinson eds., 2003). 
 53. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 4. 
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new rights, like the wholesale printing of currency, causes a massive 
inflation of rights that devalues their moral claims.”54 The clamor for 
rights takes up a significant portion of the Supreme Court’s docket, 
ranging from the right of individuals to possess firearms55 to the right 
of gay people to marry56 to the “right” not to have to pay for health 
insurance.57 The problem, says Etzioni, is that “each newly minted 
right generates a claim on someone.”58 Thus, if we recognize a “right” 
to health care, those unable to afford it will look to someone else 
(most likely an employer or the American taxpayer) to foot the bill.  
 The second point on Etzioni’s communitarian agenda is that rights 
entail responsibilities. Professor Mary Ann Glendon has expressed 
the problem best: “Buried deep in our rights dialect is an unex-
pressed premise that we roam at large in a land of strangers, where 
we presumptively have no obligations toward others except to avoid 
the active infliction of harm.”59 We are not mere consumers of rights 
ordained under the Constitution and state and federal statutes; citi-
zenship means that we undertake certain responsibilities as well. 
And so, perhaps a business that takes advantage of the corporate 
form (i.e., indefinite life, limited liability on the part of its owners, 
etc.) carries along with it certain obligations to its employees, con-
sumers, other contractors, and the communities in which it does 
business.60 
 Note, however, that not all of these responsibilities must be prod-
ucts of legal compulsion. Some should be recognized as the moral and 
ethical obligations of a good citizen. It is not enough for Mr. Trump to 
justify a series of business bankruptcies by saying that he availed 
                                                                                                                       
 54. Id. at 5. 
 55. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 56. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 57. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). While conservative 
critics of the Affordable Care Act rallied around this argument, the more potent view (sup-
ported by five Justices) was that Article I of the Constitution did not grant Congress the 
power to mandate the purchase of health insurance. Id. at 561 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
and Alito, J., dissenting). 
 58. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 6 (emphasis omitted).   
 59. GLENDON, supra note 4, at 77. 
 60. Ackerman & Cole, supra note 18, at 972-73 (“[C]orporations . . . should look be-
yond the narrow objective of shareholder wealth maximization and assume responsibility 
for constituencies such as employees, customers, the communities in which the corpora-
tions operate, and even the entire world.” (citing David Millon, Introduction: Communitar-
ians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 
(1993); Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and Corporate 
Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393 (1993); Paul N. 
Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 391 (1997); Marleen A. 
O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-
Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993)).  
74  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:59 
 
himself of the protection from creditors provided by American bank-
ruptcy law.61 As a citizen and businessman (and now, as President), 
he owes some consideration to those with whom he does business, 
including making his best efforts to keep his promises. The law may 
allow you to stiff your subcontractors (or at least make them “see you 
in court” such that they are willing to accept fifty cents on the dollar), 
but we should feel morally compelled to do not just what we are legal-
ly obligated to do, but what is decent and right. 
 Sometimes, however, responsibilities can and should be legally 
compelled. Ours is a government not only for the people but of and by 
the people as well. To me that means, as a matter of constitutional 
adjudication and statutory construction, that it is neither unreasona-
ble nor unconstitutional for the government to demand some quid pro 
quo for the rights of citizenship—whether it be the payment of taxes, 
engagement in some form of national service (military or otherwise), 
or participation in a national health care plan through which those 
who are incapable of providing for themselves receive coverage at the 
expense of those who can afford to pay more.62 The times and circum-
stances call for a little more e pluribus unum and a little less don’t 
tread on me. 
 The third point on Etzioni’s communitarian agenda is a recogni-
tion that certain responsibilities may exist without an immediate 
payback in the form of capturable rights. Citizens cannot always ex-
pect immediate dividends in response to their taxes, and not all of 
our sacrifices promise a gain to be recognized on our personal door-
step. A communitarian society makes investments for the general 
welfare, be it in the form of infrastructure, public education, or envi-
ronmental protection.63 This item is only occasionally at issue in con-
                                                                                                                       
 61. Russ Buettner & Charles V. Bagli, How Donald Trump Bankrupted His Atlantic 
City Casinos, but Still Earned Millions, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/06/12/nyregion/donald-trump-atlantic-city.html; Clare O’Connor, Fourth Time’s A Charm: 
How Donald Trump Made Bankruptcy Work For Him, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2011), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2011/04/29/fourth-times-a-charm-how-donald-
trump-made-bankruptcy-work-for-him/#1f0d13667ffa.  
 62. This should not be read as a blanket endorsement of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Obamacare), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012))—legislation that has significant defects in 
both structure and actuarial premises.  
 63. Not only should we not always expect an immediate payback for these invest-
ments, we should recognize the false myth of “nontaxing solutions,” like lotteries (which, 
upon analysis, are regressive taxes that rob the poor), to pay for public goods:  
[F]rom public education to the war on illegal drugs, facile, nontaxing “solu-
tions” have been offered. Thus it has been suggested that we can improve our 
education system without additional expenditures simply by increasing paren-
tal choices among schools. . . . And how should we deal with the demand for il-
licit drugs? “Just say no.” 
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stitutional adjudication, although it is frequently grist for the politi-
cal mill in almost any discussion of legislative or budgetary priorities. 
 The fourth point on Etzioni’s communitarian agenda is one that 
has had frequent encounters with the Roberts Court: We should favor 
“careful adjustments” to reconcile individual rights with the public 
welfare.64 Some of these adjustments are made (or demanded) by the 
Court itself. Thus the requirement (often applied in First Amend-
ment litigation) that the government employ the “least restrictive 
alternative” when a legitimate government interest potentially inter-
feres with individual rights.65 But it should also mean a measure of 
deference on the part of the Court when it considers a detailed, fine-
ly-tuned statute designed to promote the public welfare. 
 The complexities of modern life together with the practicalities of 
political compromise often require deft and detailed statutory and 
administrative remedies to life’s problems—remedies ill-suited to the 
blunt instruments available to the courts. At least three cases con-
sidered by the Roberts Court—Parents Involved,66 Citizens United,67 
and Sebelius68—presented opportunities for the Roberts Court to de-
fer to careful legislative adjustments. The results, overall, were less 
than entirely satisfying.  
                                                                                                                  
ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 4. Even public-private partnerships should be examined 
lest they really entail a transfer of public goods to private ownership and a public subsidy 
of private profits.   
 64. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 11. 
 65. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (stating 
in a Religious Freedom Restoration Act case that “in order for the Health and Human Ser-
vices mandate to be sustained, it must also constitute the least restrictive means of serving 
that interest”); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014) (stating that although 
the Massachusetts Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act––which establishes buffer 
zones at abortion clinics––is content neutral, it is not “narrowly tailored” because the gov-
ernment pursued its legitimate interests “by the extreme step of closing a substantial por-
tion of a traditional public forum to all speakers. . . . without seriously addressing the prob-
lem through alternatives that leave the forum open for its time-honored purposes”) (em-
phasis added); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding “stolen valor” law did 
not survive strict scrutiny partly because it was not the least restrictive alternative); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (making it “incumbent upon [the government] to 
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without 
infringing First Amendment rights”). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act essentially 
codified the test that the Court articulated in Sherbert v. Verner after Sherbert was over-
turned by Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Eric Alan Shumsky, The 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Postmortem of a Failed Statute, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 81, 
128-29 (1999). 
 66. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
(decided with Meredith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 551 U.S. 701 (2007)).  
 67. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 68. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
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 Sebelius may have been the best example of this phenomenon. The 
Obama Administration and a majority of Congress69 felt that in order 
to provide more widespread health care coverage, it would be neces-
sary to require all Americans (either individually or through their 
employers) to purchase health insurance. Only through a mandate to 
obtain health care coverage could the Administration assure that 
there would be a large enough insurance pool to cover Americans 
previously deemed uninsurable (mostly those with pre-existing condi-
tions); to cover such persons without the mandate would leave insur-
ers at the mercy of adverse selection.70 Passage of the Affordable Care 
Act did not quite result in universal health care coverage, but it did 
result in the insuring of twenty million Americans who did not previ-
ously enjoy such coverage.71 
 In Sebelius,72 opponents of Obamacare asserted that the legisla-
tion ran counter to fundamental liberties in that it required that eve-
                                                                                                                       
 69. The Affordable Care Act was passed when Democrats controlled the White House 
and enjoyed slim majorities in both houses of Congress. It was ultimately enacted without 
a single Republican vote. Shailagh Murray & Lori Montgomery, House Passes Health-
Care Reform Bill Without Republican Votes, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/21/AR2010032100943.html? 
sid=ST2010032201830 [https://perma.cc/SJ8W-NVT8]. Granted, the Obama Administration 
made repeated efforts to compromise on the legislation. Norm Ornstein, The Real Story of 
Obamacare’s Birth, ATLANTIC (July 6, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2015/07/the-real-story-of-obamacares-birth/397742/ [https://perma.cc/7QMM-U4K3]. But 
the absence of anything approaching consensus not only made the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) vulnerable to attack, it imposed a major overhaul of the healthcare system on a na-
tion unprepared to accept its shortcomings (including major technological glitches in the 
initial rollout) as an inevitable (and amendable) consequence of reform. 
 70. Apparently, some insurers operating under the ACA have been debilitated due to 
the problem of adverse selection: 
[I]nstead of a large number of individuals purchasing and paying for health in-
surance to cover the claims of a relatively small number who incur substantial 
health care costs, far fewer individuals are paying premiums to cover those 
same health insurance contingencies. Most high-risk consumers remain in the 
insurance pool to collect benefits, while younger and healthier consumers might 
leave the pool and stop paying premiums, thereby raising the unit cost of 
health insurance considerably. It is imperative to minimize adverse selection in 
order for health insurance to remain a financially viable product. 
NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ADVERSE SELECTION ISSUES AND HEALTH INSURANCE EX-
CHANGES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2011), http://www.naic.org/store/free/ASE-
OP.pdf [https://perma.cc/A434-8G6Y]. This problem may now be exacerbated by the repeal 
of the individual mandate through recent tax legislation. See infra note 74. 
 71. Twenty million people have gained health insurance coverage because of the Af-
fordable Care Act, estimates show. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., 20 Million People Have Gained Health Care Insurance Coverage Because of the 




 72. 567 U.S. at 519. 
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ry American (either individually or through one’s employer) purchase 
health insurance. To do so, in a simile employed by Justice Antonin 
Scalia, would be like requiring all Americans to purchase broccoli—
something that might be beneficial to their health, but something 
that Congress lacked the power to require.73 Chief Justice Roberts’ 
opinion appeared to be headed in precisely that direction when he 
performed an about-face and declared that because the mandate’s 
enforcement mechanism—a penalty assessed against persons who 
did not purchase insurance—was a tax, Congress had the power to 
impose it.74 
 The Affordable Care Act, an act of Congress nearly 1,000 pages in 
length, seems to be a set of “careful adjustments” to reconcile indi-
vidual rights with the general welfare.75 It would also seem that the 
Legislature—and not the Court—would be the appropriate branch of 
government to fashion, debate, and enact such adjustments, with the 
Court intervening only if the measures undertaken by Congress had 
a draconian effect on individual rights.76 But in the United States of 
                                                                                                                       
 73. Id. at 660 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (saying that the failure to enter the health-
insurance market, like the failure to buy cars and broccoli, is not “an activity that Congress 
can ‘regulate’ ” (emphasis omitted)). 
 74. See id. at 561-74 (majority opinion) (holding that Obamacare’s requirement that 
certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reason-
ably be characterized as a tax, permitted by the Constitution). To constitutionalize a forced 
payment by calling it a “tax” is an exercise in formalist legerdemain. If Congress can force 
citizens to pay a tax, why can it not force citizens to make another form of payment, i.e., to 
a health insurer? Granted, the Sixteenth Amendment allows Congress to tax incomes, but 
is a penalty for refusing to participate in Obamacare really a tax on income?  
 The “tax” rationale ultimately became an instrument for upending the individual man-
date, as it allowed a Republican Congress and Obama’s Republican successor to use a tax 
measure (requiring only a simple congressional majority under Congress’s arcane budget 
reconciliation procedures) to repeal it. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97,  
§ 11081 (2017). Said President Trump, employing his usual hyperbole: “We eliminated an 
especially cruel tax that fell mostly on Americans making less than $50,000 a year—forcing 
them to pay tremendous penalties simply because they could not afford government-
ordered health plans. We repealed the core of disastrous Obamacare—the individual man-
date is now gone.” President Donald Trump, State of the Union Address, (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-
address/ [https://perma.cc/N7YK-DGW8]. 
 75. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Obamacare), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012)). Republi-
can critics of Obamacare would say that the sheer length and complexity of the legislation 
are among its shortcomings. 
 76. An enactment of this complexity also requires the promulgation of regulations––
more carefully tailored adjustments––by the Executive Branch, and the Affordable Care 
Act frequently delegates authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(2)(B) (2012) (“The Secretary shall issue regulations under which 
employer contributions to a health savings account . . . may be taken into account in de-
termining the level of coverage for a plan of the employer.”); id. § 18031(h)(1) (“Beginning 
on January 1, 2015, a qualified health plan may contract with . . . a health care provider 
only if such provider implements such mechanisms to improve health care quality as the 
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America, the National Legislature (Congress) is limited to those pow-
ers enumerated in the Constitution (chiefly, in Article I). In other 
words, the Constitution does not give Congress a blank check to en-
act whatever measures it wants without constraint. While in the 
past, the Court had been willing to defer to Congress regarding re-
strictions on human activity (typically under a broad reading of the 
Commerce Clause),77 in this instance, Congress required activity; that 
is, it required that Americans purchase health insurance. It is diffi-
cult to find any enumerated power in the Constitution (apart from 
raising an army78 and levying taxes79) allowing Congress to require 
an activity. But by calling the penalty for noncompliance a “tax,” the 
Chief Justice was able to preserve a legislative cornerstone of the 
Obama Administration while still providing legal justification for fu-
ture challenges to Congressional mandates. 
 Sebelius may nevertheless be viewed as a communitarian decision 
on two counts. For one, it preserved a “carefully tailored” legislative 
solution to promote the general welfare against an individual rights 
challenge. Procedurally, it evidenced willingness on the part of a con-
servative Chief Justice to acknowledge the Article I argument (with 
the concurrence of four other Justices), while avoiding the disruption 
and chaos that would have followed the striking down of the legisla-
tive centerpiece of a president from the opposing political party. I 
suspect that it is no accident that the opinion was authored by the 
Chief Justice who, despite his Republican pedigree and conservative 
leanings, may have considered it his duty not to upset the apple cart 
in an election year.80 The Sebelius decision can, therefore, be viewed 
                                                                                                                  
Secretary may by regulation require.”); id. § 18116(c) (“The Secretary may promulgate 
regulations to implement this section,” which prohibits discrimination in federally funded 
health programs.). 
 77. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) 
(holding Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit racial discrimination 
in public accommodations.); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1942) (holding Con-
gress had power under the Commerce Clause to impose limitation on wheat production by 
farmers.); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941) (holding Congress had power 
under the Commerce Clause to regulate employment conditions.). 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 79. Id. amend. XVI. 
 80. Roberts may not have been the first Chief Justice to have done this. William 
Rehnquist’s service as Chief Justice was marked by a subtle but noticeable move from his 
role as the Court’s conservative stalwart to a more centrist position. See, e.g., Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000) (declining to overturn Miranda—despite 
Rehnquist being an early and harsh critic of Miranda—because it “has become embedded 
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of  our national 
culture”); see also Aaron J. Ley & Gordie Verhovek, The Political Foundations of Miranda v. 
Arizona and the Quarles Public Safety Exception, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 206, 240-41 (2014). 
 The Obamacare applecart was eventually upset in the 2016 election. Whatever one’s 
views on the substance, that is as it should be. Obamacare was done by political forces, and 
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as communitarian from both a substantive and procedural stand-
point. It upheld the general welfare (as perceived by the President 
and Congress) on the narrowest of grounds, handed libertarians a 
Pyrrhic victory, and avoided political chaos. The repeal of Obamacare 
would require a political change by the electorate in the form of a 
new president, and at least in 2012, that was a change the American 
people were unwilling to make.81 
 Communitarian philosophy, of course, extends well beyond Professor 
Etzioni’s four-point agenda. A Responsive Communitarian Platform,82 
promulgated at roughly the same time as Professor Etzioni’s seminal 
work, articulates a number of principles for “shoring up the moral, so-
cial, and political environment.”83 Since that time, hundreds of people 
(this Author included) have signed onto the platform, and a number of 
commentators have expounded upon the communitarian vision.84 
 It is difficult to capture the full range of communitarian thought 
in a few paragraphs. Daniel Bell (who has a vision of communitarian-
ism somewhat different but nevertheless compatible with that of 
Etzioni) has observed, “[c]ommunitarian politics entails that citizens 
should be engaged in politics as members of a nation committed to 
advancing its common good rather than as private persons with par-
ticular interests to advance.”85 That is not a bad working definition, 
but no single solution or legislative agenda will fully address the 
                                                                                                                  
so will it be undone (if Republicans in Congress and the White House can finally figure out, 
after six years, just how they have meant to replace Obamacare). 
 In Bell, supra note 8, at 62, a book structured as a dialogue, Daniel Bell’s communitar-
ian protagonist says, “[w]ere Americans to restructure their health-care system in such a 
way as to guarantee medical care for all, I don’t expect serious opposition to last.” Perhaps 
Bell underestimated the depth or intensity of the opposition. Or perhaps Democrats have 
succeeded in creating yet another “entitlement” that Republicans find politically impossible 
to repeal. 
 81. Ironically, that is a change the electorate may have been willing to make a year 
later, when the rollout of Obamacare proved problematic. Mr. Trump’s election in 2016 
may have underscored that policy preference, although polls taken just a few months later 
suggested a slight preference to Obamacare over its repeal. See Margot Sanger-Katz & 
Haeyoun Park, Obamacare More Popular Than Ever, Now That It May Be Repealed,  
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/01/us/politics/ 
obamacare-approval-poll.html?_r=0; Robert King, Poll: Obamacare Gaining Popularity, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/poll-obamacare-
gaining-popularity/article/2615671 [https://perma.cc/RD2G-4ECG]; Steven Shepard, Poll: 
Support for Obamacare is Rising, POLITICO (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/ 
2017/02/obamacare-repeal-replace-poll-235245 [https://perma.cc/WLZ2-RNJA].  
 82. See Communitarian Platform, supra note 7.  
 83. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 247. 
 84. New Endorsers of the Responsive Communitarian Platform, COMMUNITARIAN 
NETWORK, https://communitariannetwork.org/new-endorsers [https://perma.cc/C3HK-2YSX] 
(last updated Aug. 10, 2017); see also BELL, supra note 8; BRESLIN, supra note 51; François, 
supra note 11; Hazard, supra note 29. 
 85. BELL, supra note 8, at 138. 
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communitarian ideal. Any notion of communitarian “dogma” is inimi-
cal to a movement that avoids the extremes and cultivates a diversity 
of views. Although communitarians will subscribe to common princi-
ples, the term “doctrinaire communitarianism” is oxymoronic, in that 
the movement is an evolving one that views few things in terms  
of absolutes.86 
 I therefore hope to provide not so much “the communitarian view” 
of constitutional law, but rather one person’s analysis of the work of 
the Roberts Court through a communitarian lens.87 As difficult as it 
is to boil communitarianism down to its essence, I suggest the follow-
ing communitarian concepts, gleaned from Professor Etzioni’s agen-
da, the Responsive Communitarian Platform, and other communitar-
ian writings, as conducive to an analysis of the Court’s work: 
• Exercising caution with respect to the minting of new rights. 
• Recognizing that with rights come responsibilities. 
• Maintaining checks on government autocracy and tyranny. 
• Expanding public participation in politics and discourse. 
• Eliminating invidious discrimination and promoting equality. 
• Empowering intermediate communities. 
• Transcending the impulse to reduce every problem to a binary 
choice. 
The Section that follows employs these concepts to address the work 
of the Roberts Court. 
A.   Relevance of Communitarianism to the Court’s Work 
 The ongoing relevance of the communitarian viewpoint can most 
easily be seen at the extremes. As communitarians are opposed to 
repressive authoritarianism, so the Constitution protects us against 
the most repressive and authoritarian conduct of government, as well 
as powerful and noxious intermediate (albeit private) communities, 
such as overreaching corporations or racist organizations. As we be-
lieve that human existence cannot be sustained through unremitting 
individual entitlement, so the decisions of the Supreme Court recog-
nize reasonable limitations on speech, privacy, and other individual 
rights. But focusing on those extremes tells us mostly what commu-
nitarianism is not. At least as importantly, communitarians are for 
the ability of people to organize (through government and private as-
sociations at all levels) and take collective action for the common 
good, so long as such action does not unduly interfere with the rights 
of others. The Constitution, fortunately, includes the Bill of Rights, 
                                                                                                                       
 86. Ackerman, Tort Law, supra note 5, at 654. 
 87. My insistence in the use of the lowercase “c” (Etzioni prefers the uppercase) 
demonstrates this nondoctrinaire approach. Id. at 654 n.29.  
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limiting the intrusions of government. But the Constitutional Con-
vention was originally called to remedy the impotence of government 
under the Articles of Confederation, most notably demonstrated by 
the chaos of Shay’s Rebellion.88 To borrow a few phrases from the Pre-
amble, a “more perfect Union” was needed to “promote the general 
Welfare.”89 This communitarian strain is too often neglected in consti-
tutional analysis, be it from “liberal” or “conservative” viewpoints. 
 It is my working thesis that the Court should defer, whenever 
possible, to collective efforts (typically by Congress, but sometimes by 
the states or by other intermediate communities) to promote the gen-
eral welfare. A relatively trivial objection (say, the “right” not to file a 
form indicating a religious objection to paying for employees’ contra-
ception coverage90) to a measure designed to serve an overwhelming 
public need (say, widespread access to health care) should be consid-
ered in the context of the general welfare as well as that of civil liber-
ties. Not that every liberty interest must fall by the wayside, but a 
claim of individual rights should not be allowed to throw an entire 
country into chaos or disorder.91 Just as the Bill of Rights is not a “su-
icide pact,”92 not every “rights”-based objection should cause an entire 
scheme to protect the public to come crashing down.93 But we are 
                                                                                                                       
 88. DANIEL KEMMIS, COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE 11-12 (1990) (suggesting 
that the Framers were attempting to avoid insurrections like Shays’ Rebellion when they 
drafted the Constitution); see also Ackerman, Disputing Together, supra note 12, at 53-55. 
 89. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 90. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); see also infra notes 367-72 and ac-
companying text (discussing Zubik). 
 91. Justice Ginsburg considered the religious objection to birth control coverage raised 
in Hobby Lobby, while heartfelt, to be rather trivial, and I am inclined to agree. See Bur-
well v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2798 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
The only question in my mind is whether the inconvenience to the public of recognizing the 
objection (which may have entailed no additional public expenditure) was equally trivial. 
 92. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 
337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 93. It is not altogether clear that Obamacare is the prototype for a scheme worthy of 
such protection. The Affordable Care Act is unduly long, complex, and fraught with diffi-
culty. Perhaps it is a legislative Humpty Dumpty, just waiting to be pulled down. I have 
significant doubts, however, about the ability of the Trump Administration and the current 
Congress to turn the remains into an edible omelet. After six years of promising to repeal 
the Affordable Care Act, Republicans appear not to have developed an acceptable substi-
tute. See Mike DeBonis, Ed O’Keefe & Robert Costa, GOP Health-Care Bill: House Repub-
lican Leaders Abruptly Pull Their Rewrite of the Nation’s Health-Care Law, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/house-leaders-prepare-to-vote-
friday-on-health-care-reform/2017/03/24/736f1cd6-1081-11e7-9d5a-a83e627dc120_story.html? 
utm_term=.7051004addc5 [https://perma.cc/8DZA-7TWJ]; Robert Pear, Thomas Kaplan & 
Maggie Haberman, In Major Defeat for Trump, Push to Repeal Health Law Fails, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/us/politics/health-care-
affordable-care-act.html. The reality-challenged new President after about a month in of-
fice said, “Nobody knew that health care could be so complicated.” Robert Pear & Kate 
Kelly, Trump Concedes Health Law Overhaul Is ‘Unbelievably Complex’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
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quick to concede that every assertion of government prerogative can-
not be allowed to sweep away the bona fide rights of individuals or 
groups. Oftentimes, the public interest is best served through the 
recognition and enforcement of individual rights.  
 How the Court treats litigants—largely through its interpretation 
and application of procedural rules in civil cases—also has communi-
tarian implications. I will therefore discuss instances in which the 
Roberts Court has, in a rather formalistic way, disfavored group 
remedies. This individualistic rather than communitarian view of 
civil litigation has had a distinct—although hardly uniform—
tendency to deny litigants access to remedies that are more efficient-
ly pursued through large-scale litigation. In this regard, the Court 
has indeed taken on a distinctly anti-communitarian drift during the 
Roberts years. I will discuss this in greater detail in Part III.D. 
III.   APPLYING COMMUNITARIAN CONCEPTS TO THE  
WORK OF THE ROBERTS COURT 
A.   Exercising Caution with Respect to the Minting of New Rights 
An ideal is something to be aimed at, but which, by definition, can-
not be immediately realized. A right, on the contrary, is something 
that can and, from a moral point of view, should be respected here 
and now. If it is violated, justice itself is abused.94 
 At the forefront of Professor Amitai Etzioni’s action agenda for 
communitarianism is a “moratorium on the minting of most, if not 
all, new rights.”95 In a sense, it is of little use to call for a moratorium 
on the recognition of new or expanded rights by the Supreme Court. 
The Court is not a legislature that can put the brakes on new law; 
subject to its discretion regarding grants of certiorari, the Court is 
obliged to take on cases as presented. Nobody can tell gay rights ac-
tivists or Second Amendment advocates that they must refrain from 
advancing causes such as official recognition of gay marriage or an 
individual right to bear arms, respectively, nor can Professor Etzioni 
seriously think that the Court can uphold its collective hand in re-
sponse and say, “Let’s lay off the new rights for now.” While the recog-
                                                                                                                  
27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/politics/trump-concedes-health-law-
overhaul-is-unbelievably-complex.html. 
 94. Maurice Cranston, Are There Any Human Rights?, 112 DAEDALUS 1, 14 (1983).  
 95. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 4; cf. Hazard, supra note 29, at 729 (“[A]ny 
claim of right that is sufficiently specific to be intelligible can be superseded by going up 
one more flight in the golden stairway of increasingly general principles.”).  
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nition of new or expanded rights is serious business, no periodic mora-
torium can halt the march of progress or tell the afflicted, “Not now.”96 
 Professor Etzioni’s moratorium may be more appropriate for the 
legislative and executive branches of government. Both branches, on 
both a federal and state level, have tried to ascribe special im-
portance to favored interests by employing rights-based language. 
Was the world crying out, in 2012, for an Airline Passengers Bill of 
Rights, promulgated by the Obama Administration to keep those for-
tunate enough to enjoy the luxury of air travel free of the indignity of 
having to sit on an airport tarmac for more than three hours?97 Even 
assuming that the free enterprise system was inadequate to keep the 
airlines on their toes, was it necessary to declare it a “right” not to sit 
in a stuffy airplane cabin?98 This regulation takes a back seat, how-
ever, to the countless versions of the “Taxpayer Bill of Rights” that 
have been enacted on the state99 and federal100 levels. Doubtless, 
                                                                                                                       
 96. Writing from a Birmingham jail to fellow clergymen, the Reverend Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. defended the use of nonviolent resistance to racism, and how individuals 
have a moral obligation to violate unjust laws rather than awaiting their invalidation in 
the court system. “For years now I have heard the words ‘Wait!’ It rings in the ear of every 
Negro with a piercing familiarity. This ‘Wait’ has almost always meant ‘Never.’ . . . We 
must come to see . . . that ‘justice too long delayed is justice denied.’ ” Letter from Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. to Fellow Clergymen 5, at ¶ 3-6, ¶ 1 (Apr. 16, 1963) [hereinafter King Letter].   
 97. See 14 C.F.R. § 259.4(b)(1) (2012). It is hard to place such a measure on a par with 
President Obama’s efforts to combat pollution and climate change through federal regula-
tion. See, e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 60). Unfortunately from a communitarian standpoint, the Trump Administration 
has proposed repeal of this measure. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (pro-
posed Oct. 16, 2017). 
 98. It is the rhetoric of “rights” to which I most object. It is nice for airline passengers 
to be comfortable, and perhaps the consolidation of the airline industry allowed carriers to 
be less mindful of their passengers and in need of this regulation. But must every legisla-
tive or administrative remedy be a call to Armageddon?  
 99. Several states have adopted a “Taxpayer Bill of Rights” (TBOR), including Colora-
do, COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20; Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.  § 12-39n (West 2017); 
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 213.015 (West 2017); New York, N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 3000-13 
(McKinney 2017); and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-1-110 (West 2017).  
 100. In 2014, the IRS adopted a TBOR of its own. News Releases, IRS Adopts “Taxpay-
er Bill of Rights;” 10 Provisions to be Highlighted on IRS.gov, in Publication 1,  
IR-2014-72 (June 10, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-adopts-taxpayer-bill-of-
rights-10-provisions-to-be-highlighted-on-irsgov-in-publication-1.  
 Congress has passed several pieces of legislation with “Taxpayer Bill of Rights” in the 
title. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 
3342 (1988) (containing the “Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights”); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, 
Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996); Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (containing Title III, which is 
known as “Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3”). In 2015, Congress incorporated the ten rights con-
tained in the IRS TBOR into the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 7803(a)(3) (2012). 
Congress has attempted to further amend the Internal Revenue Code to enhance taxpayer 
rights. To that end, several bills have been introduced, the most recent being the Taxpayer 
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some taxpayers have been subjected to rough handling by the IRS 
and state tax collection agencies, and some legitimate grievances are 
being addressed here. But the more layers of “rights” we proclaim, 
the less meaning each such effort conveys.  
 In light of the Court’s role in the evolution in human rights (and 
especially the rights of the LGBTQ community) during the past 
twenty years, it is by no means clear that communitarians, including 
Etzioni, would really subscribe to a complete moratorium.101 The chief 
concern, as Etzioni explained, is that “each newly minted right gen-
erates a claim on someone.”102 Several cases in which the Roberts 
Court created or expanded rights demonstrate that assertion. In Citi-
zens United,103 the Court invalidated a portion of the McCain-
Feingold Act (limiting political advertising by corporations and un-
ions), declaring (not for the first time) that corporations and unions 
have the same First Amendment rights as natural persons.104 The 
decision has exacted a price by hindering efforts to assure fair elec-
tions.105 In District of Columbia v. Heller,106 the Court for the first 
time held that the Second Amendment recognizes an individual right 
to bear arms.107 While the Court acknowledged that its rule did not 
                                                                                                                  
Bill of Rights Enhancement Act of 2015, S. 1578, 114th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate, 
June 16, 2015). 
 101. Professor Etzioni would appear to have admitted as much. See Amitai Etzioni, A 
Communitarian Position for Civil Unions, in MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, JUST MARRIAGE 63-
66 (Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds. 2004) (“Civil unions––if made available to 
both gays and heterosexuals who want to signal a different form of commitment than tradi-
tional marriages––are a reasonable middle ground. . . . Civil unions accord those involved 
in them most of what traditional marriages provide: the right to inherit, share health bene-
fits, and so on. . . . And such unions allow social conservatives to believe that that which is 
sacred to them has been respected. Such a compromise is not the best of all worlds, but it is 
the best that one can achieve in our society at this stage in history. We must respect other 
members of our community the way that we wish for them to respect us.”). Of course, much 
has transpired in the way of public opinion on gay marriage since 2004. 
 102. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 6. 
 103. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 104. Id. at 353. 
 105. See id. at 479 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s opinion is . . . a rejection of 
the common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corpora-
tions from undermining self-government since the founding, and who have fought against 
the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore 
Roosevelt.”); Ackerman & Cole, supra note 18, at 927 (“If any doubts existed as to the im-
pact of the Court’s decision in Citizens United, the 2014 midterm elections made clear that 
the Court had opened a door to unprecedented corporate political spending––with no mean-
ingful control or limitation by ‘the procedures of corporate democracy.’ ” (citing Derek Wil-
lis, Outside Groups Set Spending Record in Midterms, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/upshot/outside-groups-set-spending-record-in-
midterms-.html?_r=0)). 
 106. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 107. Id. at 636. 
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prohibit all forms of firearms regulation,108 the decision nevertheless 
places a crimp on efforts to stem firearm-related crime, with a poten-
tial toll on victims of gun violence. Thus, the reformulation of this 
right came at a potentially dear price.   
 Sometimes, however, new rights can be conferred without exact-
ing a price on others. In Obergefell v. Hodges,109 for example, the 
Court declared that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment require that same-sex couples have the 
same right to marry as those of the opposite sex.110 The advancement 
of this “new” right places a claim on nobody. Nobody’s marriage 
rights are diluted, no families are compromised; if anything, fami-
lies—the most basic intermediate community—are strengthened by 
providing official sanction and a sense of permanency to gay un-
ions.111 True, a county clerk in Kentucky can cite religious objections 
to issuing marriage licenses to gay couples, but her objections fall 
short because they go to what she may or may not do in her official 
capacity (i.e., while acting on behalf of the state), not to what she 
may do or believe as a private citizen.112 She remains free to voice her 
opposition to gay marriage and to belong to a church that refuses to 
sanctify gay marriage. What the courts have said is only that she 
may not exercise power as a public official to deny others a right.113 In 
                                                                                                                       
 108. Id. at 632.     
 109. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 110. Id. at 2604. 
 111. Some will claim that communitarianism demands that we respect the “right” of 
fundamentalist religious communities to adhere to a Biblical injunction against homosexu-
ality. Obergefell, however, does not deny them the right to make that assertion within their 
own communities. But to compel religious compliance or to impose religious strictures on 
the entire public through government action is offensive to the rights of the public-at-large, 
places a claim on all those who are not adherents to the religious doctrine being asserted, 
and is therefore probably a violation of the Establishment Clause. See James C. Nelson, 
The Religion Clauses: A Sword With Two Edges, 39 MONT. LAW 3, 3 (2014) (“The[] funda-
mentalist religious and conservative organizations cannot have it both ways. If they do not 
want the State telling them what to believe, then they cannot expect the government to 
adopt their beliefs as part of the generally applicable body of state law.”). 
 112. The clerk was Kim Davis of Rowan County. See Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-
Peña, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-
davis.html?_r=0. 
 113. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit said:  
It does not seem unreasonable for Plaintiffs, as Rowan County voters, to expect 
their elected official to perform her statutorily assigned duties. And yet, that is 
precisely what Davis is refusing to do. Much like the statutes at issue in Loving 
and Zablocki, Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy significantly discourages 
many Rowan County residents from exercising their right to marry and effec-
tively disqualifies others from doing so. 
Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 936-937 (E.D. Ky. 2015), appeal dismissed, 667 F. 
App’x 537 (6th Cir. 2016). Further: 
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her capacity as a state actor, she has no rights; and while the state’s 
power to determine who may or may not marry is compromised, the 
state is not burdened by according the right to marry to gay couples.   
 The same salutary effect was obtained over a decade earlier when, 
in Lawrence v. Texas,114 the Court decriminalized sexual relations 
between consenting gay adults. Declaring that a victimless crime is 
unconstitutional creates no victims itself. It does not harm the major-
ity when the Court extends to a subordinated minority a right that 
the rest of us have long enjoyed. Such a ruling may offend some peo-
ple’s religious beliefs or sense of morality, but those people remain 
free to retain and profess their own beliefs and moral concerns. 
Whether they are allowed to impose their beliefs and morals on oth-
ers or to make their moral judgments the judgments of the state 
through the criminal law is another issue altogether.  
 A conservative communitarian with what Beau Breslin calls a 
“thick” notion of the good might take issue with this.115 With respect 
to matters such as homosexual relationships and abortion, conserva-
tive communitarians will not apologize for drawing from community 
morals (most often religious teachings) and imposing them as pre-
cepts important to the community’s well-being.116 It is here that I am 
compelled to take a more libertarian view. I see no harm to the Re-
public in allowing gay people to partake in the same privileges and 
pleasures as heterosexuals. Abortion is a harder case because there 
one can plausibly argue that the rights of more than one human be-
ing are placed in jeopardy by the exercise of a woman’s right to 
choose.117 But as a male, I consider myself at a moral disadvantage if 
I try to decide for somebody else whether her autonomy should be 
subordinated to whatever rights the unborn may possess. So far, the 
Court seems to have struck a reasonable balance. 
                                                                                                                  
Davis has refused to comply with binding legal jurisprudence, and in doing so, 
she has likely violated the constitutional rights of her constituents. When such 
“sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the neces-
sary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion 
that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.” 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. Such policies simply cannot endure.  
Id. at 943. 
 114. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 115. BRESLIN, supra note 51, at 85. 
 116. See Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Ho-
mosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 538 (1989) (defending the “naive” view that “the justice 
or injustice of laws against abortion and homosexual sodomy may have something to do 
with the morality or immorality of these practices after all”). 
 117. See infra notes 231-38 and accompanying text. 
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 1.   Criminal Prosecutions and National Security 
 The Court should exercise caution in recognizing individual rights 
where doing so may leave the community defenseless. A proper bal-
ance must be struck, in which minor intrusions on personal liberty 
may have to be tolerated in order to avoid greater dangers. Etzioni 
provides the example of sobriety tests for truck drivers and airline 
pilots (to which we should add Amtrak engineers118), who might have 
to bear the inconvenience of a short stop and brief intrusion in light 
of the dangers that intoxication can pose on others.119 Decisions of the 
Court involving the weighing of the rights of the criminally accused 
versus the state’s interest in protecting citizens from crime also fall 
into this category. Herewith two examples of such cases, drawn from 
lesser-known decisions of the Roberts Court. 
 In criminal prosecutions, the exclusionary rule prevents the use of 
illegally obtained evidence in a subsequent trial. The Supreme Court 
developed the rule as a means of disincentivizing police from violat-
ing suspects’ constitutional rights, including the violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights by means of warrantless or otherwise illegal 
searches and seizures of evidence.120 In Herring v. United States,121 
the Roberts Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence 
(methamphetamine and an illegally obtained gun) seized from the 
defendant based on a warrant that the arresting officers had every 
reason to believe was valid but which, in fact, had been revoked. (The 
warrant was from a neighboring jurisdiction and still erroneously 
appeared in that jurisdiction’s electronic records.122) Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for the Court’s majority, opined that applying the 
exclusionary rule here would not disincentivize improper conduct by 
law enforcement authorities, which in this case was not knowing and 
deliberate, but only negligent.123 Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing 
that much of tort law is based on the premise of disincentivizing neg-
                                                                                                                       
 118. See Emma G. Fitzsimmons & Josh Keller, Why an Amtrak Train Derailed in Phil-
adelphia, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/17/us/ 
amtrak-train-crash-derailment-philadelphia.html?_r=0. 
 119. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 168 (“The introduction of screening gates is a 
good example of the type of new measures that Communitarians favor. They entail a small 
contribution by each of us, typically a minor inconvenience, and provide a major benefit for 
all of us. Likewise, sobriety checkpoints enable us to drive more safely, and drug testing 
allows us to travel more safely on mass transit, airplanes, and school buses.”). 
 120. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 121. 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 122. Id. at 137-38. 
 123. Id. at 147-48. 
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ligent behavior; ergo, police negligence could also be discouraged by 
denying the state its evidence in criminal cases.124 
 On balance, the Chief Justice has the better argument here. Crim-
inal liability, and the rules of evidence on which it is based, should 
not be subject to a game of “gotcha” when law enforcement authori-
ties—acting with neither illegal intent nor bad motive—obtain evi-
dence of crime.125 Excluding evidence negligently obtained (as op-
posed to, say, imposing civil liability on the police or government) pe-
nalizes the public, not the negligent officer or her employer. It gives 
the accused an undeserved bonus, the equivalent of a “Get Out of Jail 
Free” card, while providing the public with protection from neither 
crime nor deliberate police misconduct. It arguably protects the pub-
lic against negligent police misconduct, but that is small recompense 
for the failure to punish and deter crime. 
 Justice Ginsburg explains, however, that the Fourth Amendment is 
in place not so much to protect the guilty as to protect innocent victims 
of warrantless searches.126 So what would have happened in Herring 
had the accused been innocent of any wrongdoing? Had the search of 
the defendant in this case revealed no illegal items in his possession, 
he likely would have been arrested pursuant to the revoked warrant, 
but released immediately after the error was revealed (there being no 
other charges on which to hold him), probably within an hour.127 This 
is inconvenient, to be sure, but a small price to pay, given the serious-
ness of crime and the importance of good faith efforts on the part of the 
                                                                                                                       
 124. See id. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Public officials and the governments they 
work for are immune from tort liability for negligent behavior that does not constitute a 
knowing violation of a person’s civil rights. I view that as unfortunate. See Ackerman, Tort 
Law, supra note 5, at 682-83. But see id. at 685-90. Negligence liability might be a better 
way of dealing with negligent conduct than depriving the people of evidence necessary for a 
criminal conviction. It places responsibility where it belongs, without the gamesmanship 
encouraged by the exclusionary rule.  
  In 1971, then-Chief Justice Warren Burger suggested a statutory remedy that 
would supplant the suppression doctrine: “I see no insuperable obstacle to the elimination 
of the suppression doctrine if Congress would provide some meaningful and effective reme-
dy against unlawful conduct by government officials. . . . Such a statutory scheme would 
have the added advantage of providing some remedy to the completely innocent persons 
who are sometimes the victims of illegal police conduct––something that the suppression 
doctrine, of course, can never accomplish.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
 125. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg hints that the arresting officer may have been 
pursuing a personal vendetta against the accused. Herring, 555 U.S at 156 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). If that were indeed so, the maliciousness of the officer’s behavior may have 
been better reason for application of the exclusionary rule. 
 126. See id. at 152. 
 127. In Herring the neighboring jurisdiction notified the arresting jurisdiction immedi-
ately after the mistake was discovered, which was nonetheless after the search had tran-
spired. Id. at 138 (majority opinion).  
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police to fight it.128 We would be better served by a rule allowing a civil 
remedy (dispensing with the current immunities protecting negligent 
police and their employers129), providing the accused sufficient com-
pensation for actual injury but not punitive damages, because the po-
lice (despite their loss of immunity) lacked the malice or improper mo-
tive necessary to invoke such damages.130 Much as the federal govern-
ment provides compensation to families victimized by negligent drone 
strikes (or even well-aimed strikes causing collateral damage),131 local 
governments could be encouraged to maintain a fund to provide imme-
diate but modest compensation to persons who have been negligently 
detained. Negligent police conduct would be deterred, innocent and 
inconvenienced citizens would be compensated, but the public interest 
in fighting crime would be preserved.132 
 The second case, also drawn from criminal law, is more difficult. 
In Miranda v. Arizona,133 the Warren Court established protections 
                                                                                                                       
 128. Admittedly, in rare instances an arrest may mean more than a minor intrusion; 
for example, a strip search.  
 129. Over time, the Court has unnecessarily extended the Eleventh Amendment be-
yond its original and necessary meaning, especially with regard to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. Jack W. Pirozzolo, Comment, The States Can Wait: The Immediate Appealabil-
ity of Orders Denying Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1617, 1622-23 
(1992); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (“[Knowledge] of suits and actions 
unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution 
when establishing the judicial power of the United States.”). Currently, police officers and 
other public officials are shielded from damages for civil liability so long as they did not 
violate an individual’s “clearly established” statutory or constitutional rights. See Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).   
 130. “Courts have traditionally agreed that punitive damages can be awarded only 
when the tortfeasor causes harm by conduct ‘that constitutes an extreme departure from 
lawful conduct’ and that is motivated by or evinces an antisocial mental state as  
well. . . . Some courts insist upon malice, ill-will, and intent to injure, evil motive or the 
like, while others have found it sufficient that the defendant engages in wanton misconduct 
with its conscious indifference to risk.” DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1064 (2000) 
(footnotes omitted).  
 131. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-699, MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF SOLATIA AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN (2007), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-699 [https://perma.cc/PMH9-
67FG]; see also Cora Currier, Does the U.S. Pay Families When Drones Kill Innocent Yeme-
nis?, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.propublica.org/article/does-the-u.s.-pay-
families-when-drones-kill-innocent-yemenis [https://perma.cc/FYF2-QTJH].    
 132. While there would be budgetarily-based resistance to compensating victims of 
negligent police misconduct, leaving the harm on the victim (as the rules currently provide) 
in effect requires her to subsidize behavior for which the entire community should pay. 
Victims should not have to pay disproportionately for the harm caused by negligent behav-
ior. See Ackerman, Tort Law, supra note 5, at 682 n.184. Ironically, the exclusionary rule, 
together with the immunities enjoyed by public officials and governments, has the opposite 
effect: Exclusion of evidence rewards the guilty while immunities leave innocent victims 
uncompensated. I would nevertheless leave the exclusionary rule intact (along with a civil 
remedy) where the Fourth Amendment violation was deliberate. 
 133. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda was an extension of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 
478, 490-91 (1964) (holding that where “[an] investigation . . . has begun to focus on a par-
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against involuntary and forced confessions in the form of the now 
famous “Miranda warning,” which includes the right to remain silent 
and the right to an attorney. In Berghuis v. Thompkins,134 the ac-
cused (Thompkins), was arrested in connection with a lethal shooting 
that had occurred a year earlier. Thompkins was shown the Miranda 
warning and read a portion of the warning out loud (ostensibly to 
prove that he could read), but declined to sign a statement acknowl-
edging that he had read and understood his rights.135 The accused sat 
through three hours of questioning, rarely responding except for an 
occasional head nod or short verbal response, such as “Yeah,” “No,” or 
“I don’t know.”136 The Court said, “At no point during the interroga-
tion did Thompkins say that he wanted to remain silent, that he did 
not want to talk with the police, or that he wanted an attorney.”137 
(Nor, for that matter, did he expressly waive his right to an attorney 
or to remain silent.) Thompkins complained only by stating that the 
chair he was sitting in was hard.138 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court describes what happened next: 
About 2 hours and 45 minutes into the interrogation, Helgert [the 
interrogating officer] asked Thompkins, “Do you believe in God?” 
Thompkins made eye contact with Helgert and said “Yes,” as his 
eyes “well[ed] up with tears.” Helgert asked, “Do you pray to God?” 
Thompkins said “Yes.” Helgert asked, “Do you pray to God to for-
give you for shooting that boy down?” Thompkins answered “Yes” 
and looked away. Thompkins refused to make a written confession, 
and the interrogation ended about 15 minutes later 139 
 Thompkins was charged with first-degree murder, and the above 
statement was allowed into evidence.140 A conviction was ultimately 
obtained, and Thompkins’ habeas petition ultimately reached the 
Supreme Court, with Thompkins maintaining that he had effectively 
invoked his privilege by remaining largely silent for most of the  
interrogation.141  
                                                                                                                  
ticular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a pro-
cess of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect 
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police 
have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent,” the 
accused has been denied assistance of counsel in violation of the Constitution). 
 134. 560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
 135. Id. at 375. 
 136. Id. at 375-76. 
 137. Id. at 375. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 376 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).   
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 379. 
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 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion stated that the confession was 
voluntary and, therefore, admissible.142 Justice Sotomayor wrote a dis-
senting opinion, contending that the prosecution had not sustained its 
burden of proving that the confession was voluntary.143 Here, the police 
had complied with the technical requirements of the Miranda warning. 
But had they obtained a confession that was truly voluntary? Today, 
when any viewer of television police procedurals can recite the Miranda 
warning, it is easy to forget how controversial the Miranda decision 
was when first issued. In Miranda, a 5-4 majority (against a stinging 
dissent by Justice White) declared that a four-part warning was neces-
sary in state and federal police interrogations to ensure that confes-
sions obtained during custodial interrogation were truly voluntary.144 
Custodial interrogations, said Chief Justice Warren for the majority, 
were inherently problematic (and unreliable) not only because of the 
potential for physical coercion; the very circumstances of custodial in-
terrogation were so mentally coercive that even in the absence of physi-
cal violence a suspect’s will could be overborne by the power of the 
state.145 But Justice White felt that the Miranda majority had struck 
the balance between the constitutional protections against self-
incriminating testimony and the right to counsel in a manner that did 
not take the state’s legitimate interest (i.e., obtaining useful evidence to 
convict criminals) sufficiently into account.146 If previously the game 
had been rigged against the accused, now it was being rigged against 
the state. 
 The Miranda warning has become so routine by now that the fur-
nishing of the warning does not appear to encumber the work of law 
enforcement agencies. That does not appear to be where the problem 
lies. The Miranda warning may have made suspects a little more cir-
cumspect about spilling the beans to police interrogators, but the warn-
ing nevertheless falls short of ensuring completely against involuntary 
and unreliable confessions. Communitarians would consider how a 
more proper balance might be struck between the legitimate interests 
on both sides. This is not quite the same as trying to obtain a “level 
playing field”; after all, it is not a mere game that we are playing. 
                                                                                                                       
 142. Id. at 389. 
 143. Id. at 396-403 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 144. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
 145. Id. at 448. 
 146. See id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that there was now the likelihood 
that a significant number of individuals who would have been convicted going free); see 
also id. (“In some unknown number of cases the Court’s rule will return a killer, a rapist or 
other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his 
crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but a loss, in 
human dignity.”).  
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 Instead, we should look at the reasons underlying the concern 
about involuntary confessions and the probative value of the confes-
sion obtained. Before Miranda, the concern was largely twofold: (1) 
that the quest for confessions gives rise to violent, coercive techniques; 
and (2) that involuntary confessions are inherently unreliable. In 
Thompkins, the record indicated the absence of any physical violence 
against the suspect, and the other evidence adduced at trial strongly 
suggested that the confession was reliable. But there is little doubt 
that 2¾ hours of questioning without the assistance of defense counsel 
are likely to have a psychologically coercive effect. And just how proba-
tive is the single word “yes,” coming in response to a leading question 
after that 2¾ hours? Notwithstanding the officers’ technical compli-
ance with Miranda, there is reason to believe that the probative value 
of this “statement” was outweighed by the coercive effect of 2¾ hours 
of custodial investigation of an unrepresented suspect.147 
 Back in my law school days (when the landmark cases of the War-
ren Court were received as if they were tablets from Mount Sinai), I 
argued, as had the Chief Justice in Miranda, that there was something 
inherently unseemly about prying even the truth from an unrepre-
sented individual facing the full power of the state.148 My older, com-
munitarian self asks whether this evil, without more (i.e., either phys-
ical intimidation or other circumstances suggesting that the confession 
is unreliable) is enough to outweigh the important and genuine gov-
ernment interest in fighting crime.  
 Constitutional rights should be enforced in such a way as to protect 
against real evils, usually in the form of overreaching by the state that 
causes concrete harm. They should not be reduced to mere gamesman-
ship. There is a constitutional right against self-incrimination;149 there 
                                                                                                                       
 147. The Thompkins interrogation brings to mind the videotaped interrogation of 
Brendan Dassey included in the televised documentary miniseries, Making a Murderer. 
There, a teenager of below-average intelligence was subjected to prolonged questioning 
(after having been falsely told that his mother did not wish to join him), in response to 
which he muttered monosyllabic answers. When the suspect was unable or unwilling to 
describe an important detail of the “crime” in which he had allegedly participated, the in-
terrogator described the detail in a leading manner and finally obtained a grudging ac-
knowledgment. That the subject did not understand what had just transpired (i.e., confes-
sion to participation in a brutal rape/murder) was underscored by his asking when he could 
return to school, as he had a project due in sixth period. It is very hard to see the probative 
value of this “confession.” See MAKING A MURDERER (Netflix 2015). 
 148. I recall this forty-three years later because it was a rare circumstance in which I 
obtained the momentary approval of my Criminal Law professor. 
 149. In his Miranda dissent, Justice White suggested that the prohibition on self-
incrimination may not extend beyond courtroom confessions. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). This argument collapses upon the realization that 
the end and aim of custodial interrogation is to obtain a confession that will be admissible at 
trial. 
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is also a constitutional right to counsel150 and a constitutional right 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.151 There is no con-
stitutional right not to be convicted, nor is there even a right for 
the accused to enjoy a “level playing field” against the state. So if 
(1) a confession is not coerced, (2) there is no deliberate harm in-
flicted on a suspect, and (3) there are no other circumstances sug-
gesting that the confession is unreliable (or at least lacking in 
probative value), the more compelling rationales underlying Mi-
randa are not present, and there may be no reason the confession 
should not be used to obtain a conviction and protect the citizenry. 
What is in fact unseemly about hours-long custodial interrogation 
unassisted by counsel is its tendency to draw out unreliable and 
incriminating statements from even law-abiding citizens. The 
problem is exacerbated as the age of the person under interroga-
tion declines.152 There should be a real need, or at least a strong 
interest, in order to allow government action to move forward 
when it intrudes on individual liberty. National security cases 
take such concerns to something approaching an existential level. 
They potentially pit individuals claiming important rights protect-
ed by the Constitution against the government’s need for measures 
to safeguard national security. 
 In his recent book, The Court and the World: American Law 
and the New Global Realities,153 Associate Justice Stephen Breyer 
discusses the Court’s evolving approach to these national security 
cases. Justice Breyer first describes early cases such as Ex parte 
Milligan,154 Ex parte Quirin,155 Korematsu,156 and the Steel Seizure 
                                                                                                                       
 150. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
 151. Id. amend VIII. 
 152. See Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents 
at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 221-22 (2005); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining 
Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent Development and Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSY-
CHOL. REV. 53, 59-61 (2007). The “confessions” of the five juvenile defendants in the notorious 
Central Park jogger case (discussed in the Scott-Hayward article) present an excellent exam-
ple of this phenomenon. See Scott-Hayward, supra, at 57-58. 
 153. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW 
GLOBAL REALITIES (2015). 
 154. 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866) (showing the Court’s unwillingness to give President Lincoln 
the power of military commission jurisdiction over citizens where the civil courts were func-
tioning, even during wartime). 
 155. 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (holding that the German saboteurs had no right to be tried 
neither in civilian courts nor by jury because military tribunals had jurisdiction over the 
case). However, underlying the Court’s decision in Quirin, Justice Breyer says, are “positive 
implications . . . respecting the Court’s readiness to review executive action in time of war.” 
BREYER, supra note 153, at 41. 
 156. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding the constitutionali-
ty of FDR’s Executive Order 9066, which ordered Japanese Americans into internment camps 
during World War II). According to Justice Breyer, in Korematsu, “[t]he Court took its broad-
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Case,157 which illustrate the Court’s initial reluctance but also its 
growing willingness to question presidential prerogative in time of 
war. He then takes up four post-September 11 cases—Rasul,158 
Hamdi,159 Hamdan,160and Boumediene161—in which executive branch 
efforts to combat the War on Terror, including holding enemy com-
batants at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, were challenged on 
statutory and constitutional grounds. Justice Breyer summarizes the 
outcomes: 
Taken together, [the four cases] took the government’s side on two 
matters. The Court reaffirmed the constitutional power of the ex-
ecutive branch (authorized by Congress) to detain enemy combat-
ants “during active hostilities” as in all previous wars. It also held 
that the executive could detain an American citizen fighting 
against the country as an enemy combatant. Otherwise, the Court 
[not without dissent] held for the detainees across the board: the 
habeas corpus statute did give Guantanamo prisoners the right to 
bring court cases contesting their detention as unlawful. In the 
event that a detainee . . . contested his status as “enemy combat-
ant,” the executive must provide him the basic elements of due 
process . . . . The Court further found that the executive lacked the 
statutory power to conduct trials of enemy combatants before spe-
cial military commissions, and also that Congress lacked the con-
stitutional power to suspend the “privilege” of habeas corpus for 
Guantanamo detainees without meeting the requirements of the 
Suspension Clause; detained aliens could therefore petition the 
courts for release. In sum . . . even amid serious security threats, 
the Constitution does not give the President (or Congress) a blank 
check to determine the response.162 
                                                                                                                  
est view of the President’s war powers (and its narrowest view of its own power to protect 
individual liberties).” BREYER, supra note 153, at 31. 
 157. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
(deciding that the President had gone too far, when, to avert a strike of steel workers that 
would pose serious risk to the military, the Truman Administration seized the nation’s 
steel plants in the midst of the Korean War); see also BREYER, supra note 153, at 42. 
 158. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (holding that courts had jurisdiction to 
consider claims of wrongful imprisonment by foreign aliens held at Guantanamo Bay).  
 159. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (recognizing that the President, in 
time of hostilities, has authority to detain an American citizen as an “enemy combatant,” 
but the detainee is entitled to sufficiently fair due process and a right to be heard by a neu-
tral tribunal).  
 160. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593-94 (2006) (holding that the government’s 
use of a special military commission to try Guantanamo Bay prisoners was unlawful).  
 161. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that aliens detained as 
enemy combatants at military bases have a right under the Constitution to challenge the 
lawfulness of the detention).  
 162. BREYER, supra note 153, at 77-78 (footnotes omitted).  
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 For communitarians, there are at least three important things to 
note with respect to these cases. The first is that even in wartime, 
the President does not enjoy carte blanche with respect to matters of 
national security. The Court had long departed163 from Cicero’s ob-
servation that “the laws fall silent” at time of war.164 Certain due pro-
cess guarantees remain in place, even for those designated by the ex-
ecutive as “enemy combatants.” 
 The second observation is that none of the constraints on execu-
tive power imposed by the Court posed a serious threat to national 
security. The petitioners were far removed, in both time and place, 
from any combat zone. According them due process involved no dis-
traction to troops in the field or to their commanders and no hamper-
ing of the war effort. The Court assured the petitioner’s procedural 
protections with no guaranty of a favorable outcome on the merits. In 
short, the outcomes of these cases presented no cause to invoke Pres-
ident Lincoln’s defense of his suspension of habeas corpus: “Are all 
the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go 
to pieces, lest that one be violated?”165 
 Finally, as Justice Breyer notes, the Court resisted the temptation 
to construct bright-line rules which, while “bring[ing] clarity to the 
law . . . . may prove it unworkable, if not harmful to the very security 
interests it means to advance, or needlessly restrictive of civil liber-
ties.”166 In Justice Breyer’s words:  
The temptation to generalize may be strong but must be avoided: 
bright-line rules are ill suited to a “war” the shape of which we can 
discern only dimly. . . . The inability of courts to predict accurately 
the nature of future risks, either to security or to civil liberties, ar-
gues strongly that judges should proceed case by case.167 
 Conscious of my own limitations—I am neither an expert in na-
tional security nor the law of war—I would venture to say that the 
Court gave maximum recognition to civil liberties (extending them to 
noncitizens as well as citizens) consistent with the government’s pre-
rogative to wage war effectively. Differently phrased—invoking a 
theme we will revisit later on—it allowed the government to satisfy 
its security needs in a manner least restrictive to individual rights.168 
It not only rejected the government’s invocation of a legal technicali-
                                                                                                                       
 163. At least as early as the Steel Seizure Case. 
 164. See BREYER, supra note 153, at 15, 18, 41, 78. 
 165. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 191 
(First Vantage Books 2000) (1998); BRESLIN, supra note 51, at x; BREYER, supra note 153, at 79. 
 166. BREYER, supra note 153, at 80. 
 167. Id. at 84. 
 168. See id. at 85. 
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ty—the fact that Guantanamo Bay was not, technically, on American 
soil or within the jurisdiction of any federal court—but also refused 
to ignore the risks posed by a new kind of war contemplated by nei-
ther the Framers of the Constitution nor the authors of the Geneva 
Convention.169 The Court employed neither a libertarian straight-
jacket nor an “all’s fair in war” approach. While purists on either side 
might criticize the Court’s eclecticism, it landed pretty close to the 
sweet spot for communitarians. 
 The issue in most of the criminal and national security cases that 
reach the Supreme Court is not one of “minting” new rights (as 
Etzioni might describe the phenomenon); rather, it is a matter of ex-
trapolating on long-recognized rights. The privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to legal counsel are expressly set forth in 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Escobedo,170 Miranda, and their 
progeny are extrapolations of these rights; a recognition that the ap-
plication of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments rules to actual cases 
requires explication beyond the mere recital of constitutional max-
ims. Even the most devout textualist must concede that the Supreme 
Court and the lower courts must give meaning to the general state-
ments included in the Bill of Rights.171   
 Sometimes the Court’s explanations appear, on the surface, to be 
contractions or limitations of those rights. The First Amendment 
states that “Congress may make no law”172 impairing the freedom of 
speech, but all recognize that this statement does not grant the liber-
ty to shout “fire” in a crowded theatre173 or even to defame others 
with impunity.174 But these are not really contractions of rights; they 
                                                                                                                       
 169. Perhaps the government’s resort to Guantanamo Bay (as well as “dark sites” for 
“enhanced interrogation”) was an effort to keep ugly truths offshore because, as Jack Ni-
cholson bellowed in A Few Good Men, we “can’t handle the truth.” See A FEW GOOD MEN 
(Castle Rock Entertainment 1992). 
 170. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). 
 171. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (Scalia, J.) 
(“Some have made the argument . . . that only those arms in existence in the 18th century 
are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that 
way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications, and the 
Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, the Second Amendment  
extends . . . to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in 
existence at the time of the founding.” (internal citations omitted)); cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012) (“In 
their full context, words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they 
were written—with the understanding that general terms may embrace later technological 
innovations.”). 
 172. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 173. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 174. E.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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are refinements of the Constitution’s general statements necessary to 
resolve real cases and controversies. These issues will resurface in 
new contexts (as the War on Terror has demonstrated), and the 
Court cannot avoid such cases. We can only hope that the Court re-
jects an absolutist approach to both the assertion of individual rights 
and the insistence upon governmental prerogative.   
B.   Recognizing That with Rights Come Responsibilities 
How can we be sure that rights are realizable unless they are 
matched by corresponding duties?175 
 Professor Etzioni has complained that Americans feel “a strong 
sense of entitlement . . . [but] a rather weak sense of obligation.”176 
Consequently, the Responsive Communitarian Platform recognizes 
that individual citizens, communities, and polities all have obliga-
tions, and that “responsibilities . . . must be borne by citizens, indi-
vidually and collectively, in a regime of rights.”177 Citizenship is not a 
game of claiming rights without undertaking responsibilities, of all 
take and no give.178 It should not be reduced to a mere series of 
transactions between the individual and the government or the citi-
zens it represents. Rather, citizenship (as distinguished from con-
sumerism) entails paradigms of responsibility and reciprocity: Each 
member of the community owes something to the rest, and the com-
munity owes something to each of its members.179 We are not mere 
consumers of civil liberties; we are citizens with mutual obligations. 
 While taxes are the most obvious of these obligations, one’s civic 
duty runs far deeper than this. We pay taxes to support publicly fi-
nanced schools, even though few of us have an expectation of a direct 
payback from any child but one’s own.180 We render aid to people in 
                                                                                                                       
 175. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 230 (2000). 
 176. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 3. 
 177. Communitarian Platform, supra note 7, at xxv. 
 178. As Beau Breslin explains, “liberal autonomy has recently taught that rights and 
liberties can be all too readily redeemed; while the responsibilities that accompany our 
tradition of freedom can be just as easily sidestepped.” BRESLIN, supra note 51, at 67. 
 179. As left-leaning as this might sound, this precept is understood by all but the most 
libertarian of commentators. Conservative law professor Mary Ann Glendon has lamented, 
“[b]uried deep in our rights dialect is an unexpressed premise that we roam at large in a 
land of strangers, where we presumptively have no obligations toward others except to 
avoid the active infliction of harm.” GLENDON, supra note 4, at 77. 
 180. Unfortunately, an “I’ve got mine, Jack” philosophy has starved public education in 
recent decades, leaving American schoolchildren further and further behind their peers in 
other developed nations. The new Secretary of Education has been criticized for failing to 
understand that education is a public good. See Dana Goldstein, Betsy DeVos, Pick for Secre-
tary of Education, Is the Most Jeered, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/02/03/us/politics/betsy-devos-nominee-education-secretary.html; Kate Zernike, Nomi-
nee Betsy DeVos’s Knowledge of Education Basics Is Open to Criticism, N.Y. TIMES  
 
98  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:59 
 
peril, even though the law rarely requires it. We look for ways that 
we can employ our talents for the benefit of our neighborhoods, our 
religious and fraternal organizations, and those less fortunate than 
ourselves. Despite the apparent popularity of the Tea Party, the citi-
zenry continues to recognize the need to tax itself.181 The Northwest 
Ordinance’s set-aside of one section in each township to support pub-
lic schools was but an early version of the recognition of public 
goods,182 which benefit the community at large. Responsibility to oth-
ers manifests itself sometimes as a private and sometimes as a public 
obligation. As the late American philosopher Yogi Berra explained, 
“You go to someone’s funeral because someday you’ll want them to 
come to yours.” 
 Rarely are these responsibilities (except for taxes and, for some, 
military service) imposed by governmental fiat, and that is entirely 
appropriate in a free country. And the Supreme Court—which like 
most Anglo-American courts is reactive, not proactive—is rarely in a 
position to impose such responsibilities. Still, it can recognize and 
support the efforts of other branches of government to promote reci-
procity. Acting with due respect for a sustainable environment is 
                                                                                                                  
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/politics/betsy-devos-education-
secretary-confirmation-donald-trump.html.  
 181. In November 2016, the voters of metropolitan Detroit narrowly rejected a tax as-
sessment to support public transportation in this transit-starved area. See Regional Trans-
it Authority Tax Proposal Narrowly Defeated in Metro Detroit, CBS DETROIT (Nov. 9, 
2016, 9:30 AM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2016/11/09/regional-transit-proposal-rejected-in-
oakland-macomb-counties-fate-hangs-on-wayne-washtenaw-voters/ [https://perma.cc/584U-
Z3NT]. Previous referenda have supported the Detroit Zoo and the Detroit Institute of Art. 
See Patricia Cohen, Suburban Taxpayers Vote to Support Detroit Museum, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/arts/design/detroit-institute-of-arts-
county-millage-tax-approved.html; Bill Laitner, Detroit Zoo Millage Renewal Gets OK from 
Voters, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 3, 2016, 9:43 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/ 
local/michigan/2016/08/02/detroit-zoo-millage-okd-oakland-co-leads-macomb/87979300/ 
[https://perma.cc/R3KS-WS4Q]. Those voting on the affirmative side in these contests rec-
ognize that citizenship sometimes means supporting public goods that will not result in 
“immediate payback” to themselves. “I’ve never been to the DIA, but I think we should all 
support it” was a common refrain even among residents of Macomb County, Michigan, a 
county that voted for the art museum levy despite its reputation as a stronghold of 
“Reagan Democrats” and its subsequent narrow support for Donald Trump in the 2016 
presidential election. See David Muller, After Winning Michigan for Trump, Macomb Coun-
ty Viewed as Symbol of U.S. Political Realignment, MLIVE (Nov. 10, 2016, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2016/11/macomb_county_could_represent.htm
l [https://perma.cc/KM7S-ZGXF]; Christina Hall & Eric D. Lawrence, Macomb vs. Every-
body? County Flexes Muscles in Regional Fights, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 29, 2016, 10:49 
AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/2016/11/29/macomb-regional-transit-millage-
dia-zoo/93922816/ [https://perma.cc/KL7V-N856]. 
 182. Local public goods are generally understood to be “public goods whose effects in-
volve a relatively limited geographical area, such as roads, streets, parks, recreational 
facilities, schools, libraries, and police or fire protection, these being only part of this huge 
array of resources.” Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local Public Goods: Toward a 
Better Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAW. 1, 10 (2004).     
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prominent in this regard; environmental measures often ask citizens 
to “pay it forward,” recognizing that short-term sacrifices may be 
necessary in order to foster long-term gains. The Court has, as often 
as not, supported executive branch efforts to refine and enforce more 
general environmental protection measures enacted by a Congress that 
was more communitarian than the Congresses we have seen of late.183   
 In at least two prominent cases, however, Citizens United184 and 
Hobby Lobby,185 the Roberts Court failed to recognize that certain 
privileges granted by the government are subject to limitations and 
burdens. When a business incorporates, it does so largely to enjoy 
advantages not enjoyed by unincorporated associations—advantages 
such as perpetual existence and limited liability for its owners. At 
one time, the privilege to incorporate was conferred sparingly and 
limited to those entities that could demonstrate to the state that they 
would fulfill some worthwhile public purpose.186 Today, while incor-
poration is more freely allowed, corporations nevertheless are ex-
pected to undertake certain civic responsibilities and burdens.187 One 
such burden, or so we thought, involved limitations on participation 
in political campaigns. The Roberts Court, invoking “rights” rhetoric, 
decided in Citizens United that the barriers that distinguished corpo-
rations from flesh-and-blood citizens were artificial, and that corpo-
rations (and labor unions) enjoyed all the same rights as natural per-
sons to participate in political campaigns.188 This would include, pre-
                                                                                                                       
 183. E.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014). Contra Ra-
panos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006); see also BRIANNE GOROD, CONSTITUTION-
AL ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., ROBERTS AT 10: ROBERTS’ ENVIRONMENTAL LAW RECORD: IT’S 
NOT GOOD, BUT DON’T COUNT HIM OUT, https://www.theusconstitution.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/12/Roberts_at_10_06_Environment_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6L8-AB3E]. 
 184. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).     
 185. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).     
 186. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 426-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 187. Some of these, like the political spending limitations struck down in Citizens 
United, are imposed by law. Others, like charitable works, are undertaken voluntarily, out 
of a sense of civic obligation. A communitarian approach to corporate citizenship would 
impose obligations on the part of corporations to do more than simply return maximum 
profits to shareholders, and would require them to take the interests of employees, contrac-
tors, customers, and other members of the community into account. 
It is only when corporations are allowed, and even required, to adopt a more 
communitarian view—one that does not see profit maximization as the corpora-
tion’s sole raison d’etre and the owners as the only people that matter—that 
corporate activity, whether in the form of charitable works, regard for workers, 
the environment, the community, or even political expenditures, can take on a 
less rapacious, more humane form. 
Ackerman & Cole, supra note 18, at 1013-14. 
 188. Elsewhere, I have acknowledged that Citizens United has a communitarian side in its 
recognition of the role that intermediate communities like corporations and unions may play in 
organizing people for a common purpose. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
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sumably, corporations whose ownership and/or management were 
neither citizens nor residents of the United States and which did not 
necessarily share the same interests as the nation’s citizens.189 
 A similar result was obtained in Hobby Lobby. There, the Court 
held that the religious objections190 of a closely held corporation’s191 
owners exempted the corporation from an Obamacare requirement 
that it purchase health insurance that included birth control cover-
age for corporate employees.192 The Court said, in effect, that a corpo-
ration could practice religion, taking on the religious beliefs of its 
owners. In both Hobby Lobby and Citizens United, corporations were 
allowed to exercise political or religious rights that previously were 
accorded only to real persons, while giving up no corporate privileges 
in return. The corporate petitioners could have their cake and eat it 
too—all rights and no concomitant responsibilities. This is especially 
pernicious if a corporation is deemed to have no responsibility save 
maximum return of profit to its shareholders, with none of the moral 
constraints that limit human rapaciousness. 
 In another article, Professor Lance Cole and I have proposed that 
the Roberts Court’s personification of corporations—with its at-
tendant extension of rights—justifies the imposition of obligations on 
corporations beyond the production of optimal return to shareholders. 
Lacking the moral conscience of real persons, corporations may po-
tentially act like monsters if left unchecked.193 And so either limita-
tions must be imposed on corporate activities or obligations must be 
imposed on corporate actors in order to restore balance. A sense of 
moral obligation—of the responsibilities we owe to one another as 
members of a community—must be imposed on corporations if they 
                                                                                                                       
 189. As the Court in Citizens United explained: 
If taken seriously, our colleagues’ assumption that the identity of a speaker has 
no relevance to the Government’s ability to regulate political speech would lead 
to some remarkable conclusions. Such an assumption would have accorded the 
propaganda broadcasts to our troops by “Tokyo Rose” during World War II the 
same protection as speech by Allied commanders. More pertinently, it would 
appear to afford the same protection to multinational corporations controlled by 
foreigners as to individual Americans: To do otherwise, after all, could “en-
hance the relative voice” of some (i.e., humans) over others (i.e., nonhumans). 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 190. These objections were brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb, not under the First Amendment per se. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 191. Professor Lance Cole and I have suggested that the Hobby Lobby holding should 
be limited to closely held corporations, although the opinion does not explicitly say so. See 
Ackerman & Cole, supra note 18, at 968.  
 192. One of the covered forms of birth control was considered an abortion prohibited 
under the owners’ religious beliefs. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765. 
 193. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 18, at 993-94.  
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wish to be treated in the same manner as sentient beings.194 Recogni-
tion of this constraint is, so far, missing from the jurisprudence of the 
Roberts Court. 
C.   Maintaining Checks on Government Autocracy and Tyranny 
The power the Constitution grants it also restrains.195 
 The flip side of the recognition of individual rights is the exercise 
of government power. While of late, communitarians like Professor 
Etzioni have bemoaned the extension of individual rights, communi-
tarians’ aversion to autocracy means that we cannot overlook the 
need to curb governmental overreach. While it is sheer hyperbole to 
deride virtually all regulatory efforts as the footsteps of jackbooted 
stormtroopers, tyrannical government is precisely what the Bill of 
Rights was designed to prevent.   
 A considerable amount of the Supreme Court’s business involves 
placing limits on a sometimes overbearing government, be it in the 
form of regulations that compromise religious beliefs,196 liability rules 
that have a chilling effect on speech,197 draconian restrictions on re-
productive rights,198 intrusions into the bedroom,199 or overzealous 
restrictions on immigration.200 The Court’s efforts to invoke neutral 
principles in this area are often overshadowed by politically charged 
debate in the public arena. To some, it is tyranny for the federal gov-
ernment to command individuals to purchase health insurance;201 to 
an almost altogether different group, it is tyranny for the State of 
                                                                                                                       
 194. Id. at 994. (“[I]f corporations are to be endowed with human qualities and human 
rights, those qualities should include due regard for those who (along with shareholders) 
are affected by corporate conduct. Along with rights come responsibilities.”). 
 195. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). 
 196. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015) (holding the Arkansas Department of 
Correction’s policy, as applied, violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §2000 (2012), “which prohibits a state or local gov-
ernment from taking any action that substantially burdens the religious exercise of an 
institutionalized person unless the government demonstrates that the action constitutes 
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest”). 
 197. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2017 (2015) (recognizing the necessity 
of “ ‘extend[ing] a measure of strategic protection’ to otherwise unprotected false state-
ments of fact in order to ensure enough ‘breathing space’ for protected speech”). 
 198. E.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).  
 199. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).     
 200. The Fourth Circuit struck down President Trump’s latest travel ban. See Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-2231, 2018 WL 894413, at *20 (4th Cir. Feb. 
15, 2018). Recently, the Supreme Court said it would hear the issue in 2018 by granting 
certiorari in Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-965, 2018 WL 324357 (Jan. 19, 2018) (mem.). The 
Supreme Court let the third ban go into effect while the case is pending. 
 201. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
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Texas to impose new limitations on where a woman may go to obtain 
an abortion.202 
 At the outset, we should be clear about this much: For the most 
part, governments (including the states and the federal government) 
do not have rights.203 But that is not to say that government has no 
useful role. True federalists, in the Madison/Hamilton/Jay mold, rec-
ognize that there are some vital functions only a strong national gov-
ernment is cut out to perform. And states (along with their local sub-
divisions) may function as intermediate communities, taking on func-
tions more suitable to smaller government entities that are presuma-
bly closer to the citizenry.204  
                                                                                                                       
 202. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.   
 203. Several qualifications are in order here. States do have some rights, mostly having 
to do with rights that states have between and among themselves. In the international 
system, states have a right of self-defense; when they are invaded by another state, they 
have a right to defend themselves. U.N. Charter art. 51 (providing for the right of countries 
to engage in self-defense, including collective self-defense, against armed attack). Fairly 
recently, international law has recognized a right of collective defense (e.g. NATO). See id.; 
North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. Within the Unit-
ed States, the Constitution recognizes a state’s right not to give up territory to another 
state or to merge with another state, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, and to be protected from 
suits from citizens of other states, see U.S. CONST. amend XI. The Eleventh Amendment 
has been interpreted to also preclude certain suits by citizens against their own states, see 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890), an unduly broad interpretation in my view.  
 For good reason, the Supreme Court has declared that states may not be comman-
deered to do the bidding of the federal government. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
919 (1997) (“The Framers’ experience under the Articles of Confederation had persuaded 
them that using the States as the instruments of federal governance was both ineffectual 
and provocative of federal-state conflict.” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992) 
(“Congress may not commandeer the States’ legislative processes by directly compelling 
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.” (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal statute conditioning granting of federal funds on the 
state having a minimum drinking age because Congress did not exceed Tenth Amendment 
restrictions). The federal system places American states in a very different posture than 
French departments, regional government entities that are mere subdivisions of the French 
central government, obliged to do Paris’s bidding.  
 The commandeering issue is likely to be revived as several cities across the nation de-
clare themselves “sanctuary cities” that refuse to serve as agents of the national govern-
ment in carrying out President Trump’s immigration and deportation policies. The inde-
pendence of these cities may, in turn, be “trumped” by state legislatures that command 
them, as their subdivisions, to comply with those policies. See, e.g., Julián Aguilar, Texas 
Senate Approves Anti-“Sanctuary” Legislation, Sending Bill to House, TEX. TRIBUNE (Feb. 
7, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/02/07/texas-senate-tentatively-approves-anti-
sanctuary-city-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/NTM3-DDTA] (“Republican-controlled Texas 
Senate [gives] its final stamp of approval . . . to a controversial bill that would gut funding 
from local and state entities that don’t enforce immigration laws.”). 
 204. Political scientist Beau Breslin claims that today’s communitarians have much in 
common with eighteenth-century anti-Federalists, in that they favor smaller governmental 
units and oppose concentration of power in a central government. BRESLIN, supra note 51, 
at 11-14. Not quite, as far as this communitarian is concerned. True, modern communitari-
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 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (a former state legislator and jurist) 
observed that “the Constitution divides authority between federal 
and state governments for the protection of individuals. State sover-
eignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to citi-
zens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’ 
”205 Some of the Constitution’s limitations on government tyranny 
and autocracy are structural. Both the separation of powers (among 
the three branches of government) and, as Justice O’Connor ob-
served, the division of powers (between the federal and state gov-
ernments) serve as checks on governmental power. The Constitution 
outlines processes for lawmaking (e.g., placing the legislative power 
in Congress, subject to a presidential veto) and adjudication (e.g., the 
due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) 
that tend to limit overreach. The President may not be able to cir-
cumvent deportation of undocumented immigrants not because it is 
inherently evil to do so, but because the Constitution forbids the 
President from unilaterally amending the immigration laws without 
the consent of a Congress that may be inconveniently controlled by 
his political opponents.206 President Obama’s inclination to end-run 
the legislative process and keep immigrant families intact did not 
make him a tyrant, but his benign intentions did not allow him to 
thwart the will of a Congress that refused to move as quickly as he 
would have to loosen the nation’s statutory limitations on immigra-
tion. Likewise, President Trump cannot arbitrarily restrict entry into 
the country by executive fiat.207 What differentiates a republic from 
more autocratic forms of government are the structural constraints 
that prevent leaders from disregarding the rules when they are  
inconvenient.  
 To communitarians, sitting at or near the political center, the pre-
sent level of governmental intrusion in the United States may elicit 
little more than a shoulder shrug, rather than a clarion call to the 
                                                                                                                  
ans favor government action at the most intimate level of government that can handle the 
problem efficiently. See infra note 313 and accompanying text. But that is a far cry from 
inverting the Madisonian system of supremacy for the national government. See U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 205. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
 206. I admit to oversimplification here. Like much legislation, the immigration statutes 
delegate some rulemaking power to the executive branch, which in almost any government, 
exercises prosecutorial discretion regarding what types of cases to pursue. Even President 
Trump will be unable to deport eleven million undocumented aliens at once. But the 4-4 
deadlock on the Supreme Court has let stand a court of appeals ruling striking down Pres-
ident Obama’s efforts to significantly alter the status of undocumented immigrants without 
adequate statutory authority. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex.), 
aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 207. See sources cited supra note 200.   
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barricades.208 The fact scenarios in the Roberts-era cases challenging 
government intrusion, such as the Obamacare cases (including Hob-
by Lobby) and the abortion cases (such as Whole Women’s Health209), 
hardly bring to mind Orwellian images of Big Brother. But these cas-
es, defining the margins of tolerable government intrusion, are the 
product of a mature system in which the basic legal parameters of 
government power have been long established.210 Many other nations 
would love to have this problem.211  
 Communitarians, looking for the middle ground, are apt to favor 
legislative solutions to promote the common good. These solutions, 
often as not the product of compromise (at least back in the days of 
legislative compromise), are entitled to deference from a court that 
should exercise restraint and, dare I say, a dose of humility for which 
the judicial branch of the federal government is not particularly fa-
mous.212 Some statutes (such as the notorious Jim Crow laws popular 
in the South in the century following the Civil War) offend basic 
                                                                                                                       
 208. Judging by the rhetoric from the 2016 Republican National Convention, we have 
every reason to be alarmed. What some of us regard as reasonable regulation of pollution, 
business dealings, and labor relations—with the left pressing for more regulation to meet 
the challenges of global climate change, welfare capitalism, and income disparity—is re-
garded by the political right as tantamount to slavery. See Donald J. Trump, Republican 
Nominee Acceptance Speech at Republican National Convention (July 21, 2016), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/full-text-donald-trumps-2016-republican-national-convention/ 
story?id=40786529 [https://perma.cc/NY7E-KGAC]; Harold Hamm, Speech at Republican 
National Convention (July 20, 2016). Hamm is the CEO and founder of Continental Re-
sources (one of the largest oil producers in the country), shale oil pioneer, and the thirty-
ninth richest person in the United States.  
 209. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 210. I hasten to add that we are talking about the legal parameters of government 
power here. On the street, excessive use of government power remains a daily challenge, as 
evidenced by the almost daily complaints of excessive use of police force, especially against 
African-American citizens. 
 211. As I write this, we are still in the early months of the Trump Administration. But 
we might take solace in President Trump’s compliance—so far—with judicial decrees strik-
ing down his executive orders suspending immigration from predominantly Muslim coun-
tries. See supra note 200. He might tweet about a “so-called judge,” Amy B. Wang, Trump 
Lashes Out at ‘So-Called Judge’ Who Temporarily Blocked Travel Ban, WASH. POST  
(Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/04/trump-lashes-
out-at-federal-judge-who-temporarily-blocked-travel-ban/?utm_term=.13dfe9855f1e 
[https://perma.cc/8T5A-GWZL], but so far, there have been no defiant Jacksonian utteranc-
es (“John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”) threatening noncompli-
ance, see Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court History: The First Hundred Years, THIRTEEN, 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/antebellum/history2.html [https://perma.cc/CL9E-
LE8Q] (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 212. Most readers are familiar with the joke about the psychiatrist who finds herself in 
heaven. St. Peter greets her, saying, “We’re so glad you’re here, we have a psychiatric 
emergency! . . . It’s God. He has terrible delusions of grandeur—he thinks he’s a federal 
judge!” See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Judicial Review Doesn’t Mean What You Think It Means, 
AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 9, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/judicial-review-doesnt-mean-what-
you-think-it-means [https://perma.cc/9WAS-X4LE].  
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rights and beg to be struck down. Others (such as the Texas statute 
struck down in Whole Women’s Health) are enacted on grounds that 
are merely pretextual, claiming to protect a public interest (like 
women’s health) but actually designed to advance another agenda (in 
this instance, severe limitations on access to legal abortions). Several 
of the statutes struck down in whole or in part by the Roberts Court, 
however, involve what Etzioni would call “carefully tailored” solu-
tions to promote the public welfare. With few notable exceptions, the 
work of the Roberts Court has gotten into the seams, but not the fab-
ric of comprehensive statutory enactments. Hobby Lobby invalidated 
not a statute, but an administrative regulation regarding the details 
of mandatory coverage under the Affordable Care Act.213 In Sebelius, 
the Court, while striking down a portion of that Act,214 declined to 
upend its major premise, thanks to the Chief Justice’s use of the tax-
ation rationale to preserve the guts of Obamacare. Even Citizens 
United, while invalidating a portion of the McCain-Finegold Act, left 
intact that Act’s disclosure requirements215 (much to Justice Thom-
as’s chagrin216). The statutes struck down in Heller,217 Harris,218 and 
Whole Women’s Health219 were enacted not by Congress, but by legis-
lative bodies in the District of Columbia, Illinois, and Texas. Apart 
from Whole Women’s Health, none of these decisions are positive de-
velopments from a communitarian standpoint. But it would be hard 
to contend that the Court has been tearing up the pea patch and un-
doing comprehensive regulatory schemes on a wholesale level.220 
                                                                                                                       
 213. And it did so by applying another act of Congress, the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993. 
 214. A provision of the ACA expanded the scope of the Medicaid program and increased 
the number of individuals the state must cover. A state would potentially lose all of its 
federal Medicaid funds if it did not comply with the ACA’s new coverage requirements. See 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 540-41 (2012). On the question of 
whether the ACA’s Medicaid expansion exceeded Congress’s authority under the Spending 
Clause, two opinions amounting to a majority of the Justices found the expansion unconsti-
tutionally coercive. Id. at 2601-08 (Roberts, J., concurred by Breyer, J. & Kagan, J.) (stat-
ing Medicaid expansion could survive, but states must be offered the choice to opt out of it); 
id. at 2657-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., & Alito, J.) (stating 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion is unconstitutionally coercive). 
 215. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 368-70 (2010). 
 216. Id. at 480 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 217. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that provisions of the 
District of Colombia’s Firearms Control Regulations Act violated the Second Amendment). 
 218. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (holding that Illinois’s Public Labor Rela-
tions Act, which permitted union security agreements, violated the First Amendment). 
 219. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (holding that a Tex-
as law placing a series of restrictions on abortion clinics imposes an unconstitutional bur-
den on a woman’s right to abortion). 
 220. Compare, for example, the Court’s assault on the New Deal in the 1930’s. E.g., 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 
U.S. 555 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  
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 The case of Shelby County v. Holder221 nevertheless deserves spe-
cial attention because of the Roberts Court’s willingness to strike 
down an important portion of an effective federal statute tailored to 
protect the voting rights of minority groups. In Shelby County, the 
Court struck down the “preclearance” provisions of the 2006 exten-
sion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), claiming that the “ex-
traordinary problem”222 that justified the VRA’s initial passage in 
1965 was no longer in place. Section 5 of the VRA required that sev-
eral jurisdictions (six southern states and some counties with a histo-
ry of discrimination) obtain “preclearance” (i.e., permission from the 
Justice Department or a three-judge federal district court) before en-
acting any law pertaining to voting.223 The Court noted that the re-
quirement of federal permission was “a drastic departure from basic 
principles of federalism,”224 and that the rule requiring that certain 
states obtain preclearance was “an equally dramatic departure from 
the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.”225 The Chief 
Justice cited the significant progress of the affected states since 1965 
with respect to black voter registration, voter turnout, and the elec-
tion of African-American officials.226  
 But the majority opinion scarcely mentioned that the Fifteenth 
Amendment (which expressly gives Congress “power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation”227) effectively trumped previously 
enacted portions of the Constitution pertaining to separation of pow-
ers and state sovereignty. Just as seriously, it ignored a 15,000 page 
legislative record presenting “countless ‘examples of flagrant racial 
discrimination’ since the last [VRA] reauthorization” and findings 
that “ ‘second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority 
voters from fully participating in the electoral process’ continued to 
exist, as well as racially polarized voting in the covered jurisdictions, 
which increased the political vulnerability of racial and language mi-
norities in those jurisdictions.”228 
                                                                                                                       
 221. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).  
 222. Id. at 2618. 
 223. 52 U.S.C. §10304 (2016). 
 224. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2618. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 2618-19.  
 227. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
 228. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg discussed 
how the VRA aims to curl the “new approach” of discriminatory voting practice; i.e., 
“[e]fforts to reduce the impact of minority votes, in contrast to direct attempts to block ac-
cess to the ballot . . . aptly described as ‘second-generation barriers’ to minority voting.” Id. 
at 2634; see also Jenigh J. Garrett, The Continued Need for the Voting Rights Act: Examin-
ing Second-Generation Discrimination, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 80 (2010) (“Second-
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 The Court’s refusal to defer to congressional findings in an area 
where the Constitution expressly gave Congress the power to enforce 
the voting rights of racial minorities is a matter of grave concern. 
Acting on its professed concern regarding the division of powers, the 
Court ignored the doctrine of separation of powers, giving short shrift 
to congressional findings and invading the legislative realm in a 
manner often criticized by conservatives.229 The VRA is precisely the 
type of “carefully tailored scheme” of regulation to which communi-
tarians would have us defer.230 And as we shall underscore in the 
next subsection, usurpation of legislative power in the context of vot-
ing rights is especially egregious from a communitarian standpoint. 
 1.   The Special Case of Abortion 
 The abortion cases present special circumstances. Pro-choice ad-
vocates present them as a simple conflict between individual liberty 
(a woman’s right to choose) and overbearing government regulation. 
The most recent abortion case to attract the Court’s attention, Whole 
Women’s Health, involved a heavy-handed effort by the Texas Legis-
lature to limit access to safe, legal abortions under the pretext of 
safeguarding women’s health: at best a paternalistic measure, at 
worst a subterfuge.231 When a case is postured as a clash between a 
                                                                                                                  
generation barriers . . . allow formal access to the franchise but dilute minority voting 
strength by limiting the effect that minority votes could have on the political process.”). 
 229. Recent Senate confirmation hearings for then-Judge Neil Gorsuch provide a sam-
pling: “Judges aren’t free to re-write statutes to get results they believe are more just. 
Judges aren’t free to re-order regulations to make them more fair. And no, Judges aren’t 
free to ‘update’- the Constitution. That’s not their job.” Nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch 
to Serve as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Chuck Grassley, Sen. of Iowa), 
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-statement-hearing-
nomination-judge-neil-gorsuch-serve-associate-justice [https://perma.cc/AY77-YXS8].  
Law that can change in a moment and capriciously is inherently destabilizing. 
An activist judge who makes law plants insecurity in our system. Rather, our 
Constitution provides for law to be enacted legislatively with the sanction of 
the American people through the ballot box. Policy changes advanced by judges 
can be reversed and reversed again. Law properly grounded in the democratic 
and political process cannot. 
Nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch to Serve as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Mike 
Crapo, Sen. of Idaho), https://www.crapo.senate.gov/media/newsreleases/crapo-gorsuch-
will-be-a-servant-of-the-law-not-a-maker-of-it [https://perma.cc/3FYJ-QDHX].  
 230. See text accompanying note 64, supra. 
 231. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). The Texas 
statute, enacted in 2013, imposed two abortion restrictions. The first required every physi-
cian performing abortions to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the 
abortion site; the second subjected abortion facilities to the particularly exacting standards 
for ambulatory surgical centers. Id. 
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woman’s right to control her own body and the government’s interest 
in protecting maternal health, a rights-conscious Court will be in-
clined to side with the pro-choice position. 
 But if, instead, a case is characterized as a conflict between a 
woman’s right to choose and an unborn child’s right to life, pro-life 
forces stand a fighting chance in a rights-oriented regime. The con-
flict then might revolve around whether and when an unborn child 
has cognizable legal rights, something that has never been explicitly 
recognized by the Court.232 In both American law and American poli-
tics, advocates on either side have the best chance of prevailing when 
they engage in what Professor Glendon calls “rights talk.”233 The 
careful calibration of competing interests advocated by Etzioni may, 
at one time, have come into play in the legislative or administrative 
process, but the rhetoric of rights plays out more effectively in the 
courts and in what passes for political discourse these days.234  
 This is unfortunate. Neither pro-life nor pro-choice advocates have 
a monopoly on morality.235 While the current state of abortion juris-
prudence and Supreme Court membership suggest that neither side 
will fully get its way in the foreseeable future, reasonable legislative 
                                                                                                                       
 232. In Roe, the Court declined to recognize the “personhood” of an unborn child. Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). Without personhood, there could be no cognizable rights. 
 233. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIS-
COURSE (1993). 
 234. Unfortunately, Congress seems to engage less and less in the age-old legislative 
art of forging consensus out of competing interests, instead resorting to sharp debate and 
the drawing of doctrinal battle lines. The chief culprit may be legislative gerrymandering, 
which increasingly creates congressional districts along party lines, requiring members of 
Congress to adhere to the positions clearly identified with their partisan bases. A gerry-
mander is a “distortion of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal po-
litical purposes.” Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). 
“Whether a gerrymander creates a majority party or merely increases the majority’s power, 
it may ‘lock in’ a partisan imbalance so skillfully that the legislature is not ‘responsive to 
the changing will of the electorate.’ ” Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 
FLA. L. REV. 403, 407 (1993) (quoting Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social 
Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 112 (1985)).  
 In the abortion battle, adherence to partisan bases means a pro-life position for Repub-
licans and a pro-choice position for Democrats. Any wavering or compromise from these 
positions is likely to draw a primary challenge from an opponent claiming that the incum-
bent has dared to depart from the party line. (While this orthodoxy appears to be more 
prominent among Republicans, Democrats should recall their 1992 National Convention, 
at which Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey was denied the opportunity to speak in 
opposition to a pro-choice platform plank. Michael deCourcy Hinds, The 1992 Campaign: 
Pennsylvania; Democratic Ticket Heads Into Fertile Territory, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/19/us/the-1992-campaign-pennsylvania-democratic-ticket-
heads-into-fertile-territory.html.  The Senate is somewhat less prone to this affliction, be-
cause at least some states include a diverse enough population as to encourage senators to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of both sides of the debate, and to tolerate nuance.  
 235. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (ac-
knowledging that there are moral arguments on both sides of the abortion debate).  
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compromises could reconcile a respect for human life with due defer-
ence to maternal autonomy while remaining true to the constitution-
al framework set forth in Roe v. Wade236 and its progeny.237 Unfortu-
nately, the political landscape is not availing of such mutual accom-
modation. Says Professor Glendon, “The language of rights is the 
language of no compromise. The winner takes all and the loser has to 
get out of town. The conversation is over.”238 
D.   Expanding Public Participation in Politics and Discourse 
Silent citizens may be perfect subjects for an authoritarian ruler, 
they would be a disaster for a democracy.239 
 Communitarians favor broad public participation in our democra-
cy. This necessarily includes access to legal remedies, participation in 
political life, and the First Amendment freedoms that allow public 
discourse to flourish.240 While not First Amendment absolutists, we 
are inclined to tip the scales in close cases in favor of speech and 
freedom of conscience, in large part because of the role of speech in 
preserving democratic participation. Speech, not compulsion, as we 
would allow for speech advocating a course of action that we would 
neither take ourselves nor impose on others.  
 1.   Procedural Devices to Limit Group Participation  
 Broad participation in public life includes enfranchisement in the 
voting booth and beyond. It includes access to legal remedies in a 
manner that includes the poor as well as the rich and invites partici-
pation by those who are at risk of being relegated to the fringes of 
society. In this sense, communitarianism is more republican than 
democratic, because it honors the Constitution’s efforts to preserve 
fundamental rights of minorities against the oppression of the major-
                                                                                                                       
 236. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 237. Most notably, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 837 (1992). While upholding the constitutional core of Roe, Casey’s “undue bur-
den” test has allowed states to impose waiting periods and counseling requirements on 
women seeking abortions. See David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An 
Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 844 (1999). 
 238. GLENDON, supra note 4, at 9. This statement provoked a lively debate among my 
colleagues as to who has “won” and who has “lost” the abortion debate (and who, therefore, 
has to get out of town), given the difficulty of obtaining a safe abortion in some places. 
Again (as noted supra note 21), both sides seem to choose martyrdom. 
 239. ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 97 (1998). 
 240. “Communitarians favor strong democracy. That is, we seek to make government 
more representative, more participatory, and more responsive to all members of the com-
munity. We seek to find ways to accord citizens more information, and more say, more 
often.” Communitarian Platform, supra note 7, at xxvii.  
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ity.241 Communitarians would, therefore, urge the courts to preserve 
people’s ability to obtain redress through access to the legal process, 
often by banding together as a class. 
 In a series of cases, however, the Roberts Court has (systematical-
ly, it would appear) denied access to the courts on the part of con-
sumers, employees, and persons claiming discriminatory or otherwise 
unfair treatment by the government or the private sector. Sometimes 
this has been done under the guise of procedure. In Ashcroft v. Iq-
bal,242 for example, the Court imposed heightened pleading require-
ments for individuals claiming religious and ethnic discrimination by 
the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI.243 In so doing, it 
ignored the decades-old practice of “notice pleading” allowed under 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and made it extremely 
difficult for plaintiffs claiming discrimination to move even to the 
discovery stage against federal officials.244 Rather than expanding 
access to Bivens245 actions and other civil remedies against official 
misconduct (as advocated earlier246), the Court erected a procedural 
barrier to block such access. 
 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes247 and AT&T Mobility v. Concep-
cion,248 the Court limited the ability of aggrieved litigants to coalesce 
into groups and bring class actions.249  In Wal-Mart, the Court (by a 
                                                                                                                       
 241.  
“Communitarians are not majoritarians. The success of the democratic experi-
ment in ordered liberty . . . depends, not on fiat or force, but on building shared 
values, habits and practices that assure respect for one another’s rights and 
regular fulfillment of personal, civic, and collective responsibilities. Successful 
policies are accepted because they are recognized to be legitimate, rather than 
imposed.”  
Id. at xxvi. 
 242. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 243. The case was brought by a Muslim man who was imprisoned and allegedly sub-
jected to harsh treatment. Id. It could just as easily fall under the earlier section of this 
Article dealing with state overreaching. What the Court has effectively done here is to im-
pose a procedural obstacle that undermines efforts to corral government misconduct.  
 244. As Justice Breyer’s dissent pointed out, the officials’ legitimate interest in being 
able to conduct the business of government without harassment could be effectively pro-
tected by controls placed on the discovery process by the trial court. Id. at 700 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 245. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
 246. See supra notes 127-49 and accompanying text. 
 247. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).     
 248. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).     
 249. The communitarian implications of class actions are evident. “In some  
instances . . . the class action is the only mechanism by which our legal system can redress 
a large-scale public wrong.” John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1421 (2003). 
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5-4 margin) imposed additional burdens on the commonality re-
quirement for class certification and concluded (unanimously) that 
monetary relief was improper in Rule 23(b)(2) cases.250 The decision 
on monetary relief was probably justified by a fair reading of the rule. 
But the heightened commonality requirement resulted in more front-
end litigation expenses and, as a practical matter, significantly 
reined in access to the class action remedy.251 In Concepcion, the 
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)252 preempted a 
California statute barring class action waivers in arbitration agree-
ments.253 Concepcion was but one in a line of cases in which the Court 
has adopted an overly broad interpretation of the FAA so as to bar 
access to the courts on the part of consumers, employees, and other 
aggrieved parties.254 
 Arbitration can be an excellent means of resolving disputes and 
reinforcing social capital when the process is voluntarily adopted by 
members of a trade, religious group, or other organization of like-
minded people who wish to live in accordance with the norms and 
procedures of their intermediate community.255 It is inappropriate, 
however, when fine-print arbitration clauses are sprung on unwitting 
consumers or employees who assumed that the law would grant them 
a day in court. To enforce arbitration provisions under these circum-
                                                                                                                       
 250. 564 U.S. 338, 340, 359-60 (2011). 
 251. See Richard D. Freer, Front-Loading, Avoidance, and Other Features of the Recent 
Supreme Court Class Action Jurisprudence, 48 AKRON L. REV. 721, 728 (2015). 
 252. In particular, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 253. “[T]he most active area of constitutional law with respect to the American federal 
system involves federal preemption of state law.” Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and 
the American Federal System: An Update, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 267, 287 (2016). The Roberts 
Court’s defenders will cite the FAA cases as examples of preemption cases in which the 
Court has merely shown a “[p]ragmatic [p]reference for [u]niformity.” See, e.g., Robin S. 
Conrad, The Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business Bias, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
997, 1011-13 (2009). In their eyes, federal displacement of state legislation designed to 
protect consumers or employees is but a benign attempt to avoid “regulatory balkaniza-
tion.” Id. at 1012. My argument, however, is not that the FAA does not preempt state law 
where the latter is in conflict. It is that the unnecessarily broad manner in which the Rob-
erts Court has chosen to interpret the FAA sweeps everything from its sight. 
 254. For some very good commentary, see Charles Gibbs, Consumer Class Actions After 
AT&T v. Concepcion: Why the Federal Arbitration Act Should Not Be Used to Deny Effec-
tive Relief to Small-Value Claimants, 2012 U. ILL. L. Rev. 1345; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taint-
ed Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent 
Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795, 821 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 714 (2012).  
 255. See Ackerman, Disputing Together, supra note 12, at 46 (describing the use of arbi-
tration by a relatively small, homogeneous group in the diamond trade). Arbitration also 
works well when, in a collective bargaining agreement, union-represented employees agree to 
the arbitration of workplace disputes. Unlike most consumer arbitration, labor-management 
arbitration involves sophisticated repeat players on both sides who understand what they are 
getting into and have agreed to abide by the “law of the shop.” Id. at 48. 
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stances requires a tortured reading of the FAA256 and mocks our 
promises of due process and equal justice under the law. And to say 
that the arbitration process itself is inimical to class remedies (as the 
Court does in Concepcion) suggests both unfamiliarity with arbitra-
tion practice and hostility toward citizens’ efforts to find common 
cause.257 
 2.   Voting Cases with Communitarian Implications 
 We have previously discussed Shelby County v. Holder in the con-
text of the Court’s refusal to defer to a legislative scheme carefully 
tailored to produce benign results.258 Shelby County is particularly 
egregious in that the Court struck down legislation designed to pro-
mote public participation in the face of a long and sordid history of 
racial discrimination, a history that persists, albeit in different 
forms.259 It was especially ironic for the Court to jettison the VRA’s 
preclearance requirement precisely because it had been so effective in 
reducing voting discrimination. Justice Ginsburg said in her dissent, 
“Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to 
work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your um-
brella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”260 
 That being said, it is somewhat reassuring that the remaining 
provisions of the VRA continue to have a salutary effect. In North 
Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, a unanimous three-
                                                                                                                       
 256. The very language of the FAA excludes employment disputes from its reach. See 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 (2016) (“[N]othing herein contained shall apply to 
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”). Yet the Court has chosen to ignore this lan-
guage. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). Neither the lan-
guage of the FAA nor arbitration practice prohibits the use of class adjudication in arbitra-
tion, yet in Concepcion the Court majority insists that class actions are inconsistent with 
arbitration practice. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343-44 (2011). 
Contra id. at 361 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the majority’s examples, class arbitration 
is consistent with the use of arbitration. It is a form of arbitration that is well known in 
California and followed elsewhere.”).   
 257. See THE COLL. OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS, GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES IN COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION 445-65 (4th ed. 2017) (devoting an entire chapter to class arbitration). 
 258. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text. 
 259. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent discussed how the VRA aimed to curb the “new ap-
proach” of discriminatory voting practice; i.e., “[e]fforts to reduce the impact of minority 
votes, in contrast to direct attempts to block access to the ballot . . . aptly described as ‘sec-
ond-generation barriers’ to minority voting.” Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting). These barriers include racial gerrymandering, at-large voting in lieu of district-
by-district voting to prevent minority citizens from obtaining representation, discriminato-
ry annexation, and other forms of vote dilution. Id. at 2635; see also Garrett, supra note 
228, at 80 (“Second-generation barriers, on the other hand, allow formal access to the fran-
chise but dilute minority voting strength by limiting the effect that minority votes could 
have on the political process.”). 
 260. 133 S. Ct. at 2650. 
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judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a 
state’s voter identification provisions that “were enacted with racially 
discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”261 
What distinguishes this case from the Roberts Court’s approach is 
the Fourth Circuit’s willingness to recognize the sordid facts underly-
ing what might be passed off as a racially neutral measure.262 The 
opinion thereby incorporates a dose of realism that is sometimes 
missing from the opinions of the Roberts Court. 
 Realism did prevail, however, in Cooper v. Harris,263 a 2017 Rob-
erts Court decision concerning a racial gerrymander of two North 
Carolina congressional districts. Applying a clear error standard, a 
majority comprised of Justices Kagan, Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
and Thomas upheld a district court’s conclusion that the two districts 
were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders because they “packed” 
African-American voters into a limited area,264 limiting their influ-
ence in other districts.265 The Supreme Court adopted a realistic (ra-
ther than formalistic) approach in upholding the district court’s de-
termination that racial considerations predominated in the redraw-
ing of district lines.266 
 Finding a constitutionally protected community of interest among 
African-American voters may be a relatively easy matter, given the 
dictates of the Fifteenth Amendment and the VRA. Whether consti-
                                                                                                                       
 261. 831 F.3d 204, 219 (4th Cir. 2016). The Supreme Court thereafter denied certiorari. 
See North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017). 
 262. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that before enacting the voting law, the North 
Carolina legislature requested data on the use, by race, of a number of voting practices. 
Upon receipt of the race data, the legislature enacted a law that restricted voting and reg-
istration in five different ways, all of which disproportionately affected African Americans. 
McCrory, 831 F.3d at 214. The court observed: “In response to claims that intentional ra-
cial discrimination animated its action, the State offered only meager justifications. Alt-
hough the new provisions target African Americans with almost surgical precision, they 
constitute inapt remedies for the problems assertedly justifying them and, in fact, impose 
cures for problems that did not exist.” Id.  
 263. 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).  
 264. Even without a majority black voting-age population (BVAP), electoral history 
showed that the two districts at issue were extraordinarily safe for African Americans’ 
preferred candidates. Yet the legislature redrew Districts 1 and 12, increasing their BVAP 
from 48.6% to 52.7% and from 43.8% to 50.7%, respectively. Id. at 1466.   
 265. Id. at 1459. 
 266. Id. at 1477-78. North Carolina posited separate arguments justifying the redraw-
ing of both districts. The state argued that it redrew District 1 as a majority-minority dis-
trict to avoid liability for vote dilution under section 2 of the VRA. This argument was a 
clear error of law, as the third condition for proving vote dilution under section 2 (that a 
district’s majority white bloc-voting is sufficient to defeat the minority’s preferred candi-
date) was not met in this case. Id. at 1469. Regarding District 12, the state altogether de-
nied the use of race and claimed that politics alone motivated the district’s redrawing, an 
explanation that was rejected by the Court. Id. at 1473. 
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tutional protections extend to gerrymanders motivated by purely po-
litical considerations will be tested in Gill v. Whitford,267 heard dur-
ing the Court’s October 2017 term. Will the Court see political affilia-
tions as communities with constitutionally protected interests, or will 
it continue to entertain the fiction that voting remains meaningful 
when geography is distorted and legislative districts are arranged 
such that the outcome is predetermined? An end to such gerryman-
dering would have communitarian effects, not the least of which is a 
reduction in the partisanship that thwarts consensus-building efforts 
in federal and state legislatures.268 
 We should comment briefly on the impact of Citizens United on 
public discourse. Arguably, Citizens United could be cited as a Rob-
erts Court decision that increased such discourse. By allowing corpo-
rations and unions to engage in political speech in an unfettered 
manner, the case at least theoretically increased the number of voices 
with an opportunity to be heard in electoral campaigns.269 But as a 
practical matter, Citizens United has allowed moneyed interests to 
dominate political discourse to an unprecedented extent, sucking 
some of the air out of political campaigns.270 The use of “dark money,” 
including that of corporations whose managers might be noncitizens 
with motives inimical to American interests, has further clouded the 
picture. In the end, it is hard to claim (at least with a straight face) 
that Citizens United was conducive to broader citizen participation in 
the electoral process.271 
                                                                                                                       
 267. 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (granting certiorari), argued Oct. 3, 2017. The Supreme 
Court agreed to hear Wisconsin’s challenge to the decision in Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 
3d 837 (2016), where a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Wisconsin held that a redistricting plan was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. 
The Supreme Court ordered that the injunction entered by the panel prohibiting the use of 
the plan in future elections be stayed pending disposition of the appeal.  
 268. When a legislative seat is comfortably in the hands of one party, the tendency is to 
elect representatives drawn from the extremes, rather than the more moderate, accommo-
dating representatives elected when the two major parties truly contest the election. See 
supra note 234. For a discussion of the defects of a binary approach to decisionmaking, see 
infra notes 353-61 and accompanying text. 
 269. Perhaps the principal justification of the kind of speech allowed under Citizens 
United is that it benefits the recipient as well as the speaker of the communication. 
“Speech promotes self-government whenever it informs the citizenry of information and 
arguments they need in order to govern themselves intelligently. . . . Corporations as well 
as individuals can contribute political argument and information to the public store.” Jona-
than Weinberg, On Commercial—and Corporate—Speech, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 559, 593-94 (2016). 
 270. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.  
 271. The Communitarian Platform states, in pertinent part: 
It is said that giving money to politicians is a form of democratic participation. 
In fact, the rich can "participate" in this way so much more effectively than the 
poor, that the democratic principle of one-person one-vote is severely compro-
mised. It is said that money buys only access to the politician’s ear; but even if 
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E.   Eliminating Invidious Discrimination and Promoting Equality 
No one is free until we are all free.272 
 Communitarians at their best are pluralistic.273 In his acclaimed 
work, Bowling Alone, Professor Robert Putnam distinguishes be-
tween “bonding” (or exclusive) social capital that looks inward and 
cements homogeneous groups and “bridging” (or inclusive) social cap-
ital that is outward looking and encompasses people across diverse 
social groups.274 Most of us will quickly distance ourselves from that 
strain of communitarianism that confuses community with clannish-
ness and harbors deep out-group antagonisms.275 “Liberal communi-
tarians”276 see value in ethnic, racial, religious, and other ancestral 
(or constituent) communities, but recoil from exclusionary practices 
and notions of racial or ethnic superiority. As intermediate communi-
ties go, we may acknowledge the social capital inherent in intimate, 
local, ethnic communities, but we just as often find meaning in volun-
tary associations that we form and re-form based on political, social, 
or professional values.  
 The healthiest form of bonding social capital is that which is out-
ward-looking. It places members of an identifiable group (often one 
that has been a target of discrimination or exclusion) in a position to 
cope more successfully in society and to forge mutually beneficial 
links with other groups.277 Pluralistic communitarians approach dif-
ferences not out of fear, but curiosity. We hope to avail ourselves of 
the institutions of civil society—churches, synagogues, schools, civic 
                                                                                                                  
money does not buy commitment, access should not be allotted according to the 
depth of one’s pockets. It is said that every group has its pool of money and 
hence as they all grease Congress, all Americans are served. But those who 
cannot grease at all or not as well, lose out and so do long-run public goals that 
are not underwritten by any particular interest groups. 
Communitarian Platform, supra note 7, at xxxii-xxxiii. 
 272. Quote commonly attributed to the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
 273. “Our communitarianism is not particularism.” Communitarian Platform, supra 
note 7, at xxxv. 
 274. See PUTNAM, supra note 9, at 357-58. 
 275. This is sometimes called the “dark side” of bonding social capital. See PUTNAM, 
supra note 9, at 360-61; Ackerman, Disputing Together, supra note 12, at 50. 
 276. There are some who would consider this term an oxymoron. See BRESLIN, supra 
note 51, at 34-57. Breslin prefers to describe communitarians like Etzioni, Glendon, and 
Putnam (i.e., communitarians who continue to embrace liberal democracy) as “prescriptive 
communitarians.” See id. at 64-77. 
 277. Historically black colleges and universities are one form of such groups; historical-
ly women’s colleges are another. Ideally, students at these colleges seek not an isolated, 
homogeneous enclave but a secure base from which to build bridging social capital.  They 
emerge from these institutions not bitter or isolated but confident and outgoing. 
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organizations, and the like—to build a diverse and heterogeneous 
community of communities.  
 Our first President understood how this should work even in the 
early days of the Republic. George Washington wrote, in his famous 
letter to the Jewish community of Newport, Rhode Island: 
It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the 
indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise 
of their inherent natural rights. For happily the Government of the 
United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution 
no assistance requires only that they who live under its protection 
should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occa-
sions their effectual support. 
May the Children of the Stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, 
continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other Inhabitants; 
while every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and figtree, 
and there shall be none to make him afraid.278 
 The writer Sarah Vowel recently explained, “Tolerance, [Washing-
ton] meant, was small, petty and obsolete because they lived in a big 
new country where citizens stood side by side.”279 Not mere tolerance, 
but the “good will” of other inhabitants was to be enjoyed by mem-
bers of minority groups. Our diversity was to be a source of strength, 
not the occasion for mere tolerance.280   
 Our jurisprudence, therefore, must recognize that in a country in 
which certain groups (and in particular, members of racial minori-
ties) have been systematically subordinated, efforts by communities 
to advance opportunities for subordinated groups while promoting 
pluralism should be rewarded, not stifled. Unfortunately, the Roberts 
Court has sometimes allowed rigid legal formalism to obstruct that 
task. 
 Chief Justice Roberts, in particular, has been criticized for exces-
sive formalism, or what has sometimes been called “mechanical ju-
                                                                                                                       
 278. Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport,  
R.I. (Aug. 18, 1790), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-06-02-0135 
[https://perma.cc/EPR4-YHWP].  
 279. Sarah Vowell, Join the Army and Choose Whichever God You Like, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/opinion/sunday/join-the-army-and-
choose-whichever-god-you-like.html?mcubz=1. 
 280. The 2016 Summer Olympic Games served as an athletic metaphor for this 
strength through diversity. All told, the United States Olympic Team garnered 121 medals, 
46 of them gold. The United States of America did not simply compete with the world; in 
the rich racial, ethnic, and religious diversity of its Olympic athletes, the United States 
was the world, or at least a healthy cross-section of it. See, e.g., 2016 Summer Olympics—
Medal Tracker, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/olympics/summer/2016/medals [https://perma.cc/ 
3V6E-GMZ9] (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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risprudence.”281 Cloaked in rhetoric that sounds principled on its face, 
Roberts’ opinions sometimes ignore the real-life facts which form a 
basis for good law.282 In the companion cases, Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith v. 
Jefferson County Board of Education,283 the Roberts Court struck 
down school integration plans promulgated by local school districts in 
Seattle, Washington and Jefferson County (Louisville), Kentucky. 
Both plans had the apparently fatal flaw of taking race into account 
in the assignment of students in order to obtain racially balanced 
schools.284 Both plans viewed racial balance only in binary terms 
(“white” or “nonwhite” in Seattle, and “black” or “other” in Jefferson 
County); this was particularly problematic in Seattle, a district in 
which there were a significant number of Asian, Latino, and Native-
American students.285 But the Louisville plan was designed to extend 
the benign effects of a remedy that had previously been ordered by a 
court as a means of correcting decades of racial segregation. This 
compelled Justice Breyer to ask in dissent, “Is it conceivable that the 
Constitution, implemented through a court desegregation order, 
could permit (perhaps require) the district to make use of a race-
conscious plan the day before the order was dissolved and then forbid 
the district to use the identical plan the day after?”286 Is there such a 
thin line between that which is constitutionally compelled and that 
which is constitutionally prohibited that a locality is prohibited from 
taking voluntary action to address racial imbalance in its schools? 
                                                                                                                       
 281. See Steven L. Winter, John Roberts’s Formalist Nightmare, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
549, 555 n.38 (2009). In a biting critique of the Chief Justice’s approach, Professor Winter 
describes formalism “as a mode of reasoning that treats concepts as meaningful entirely 
abstracted from their contexts.” Id. at 553.  
 282. Professor Winter explains:  
[T]he idea of formalism as abstraction from context entails a focus on abstract 
entities (rights-bearing individuals equal before the law) and their relations 
(e.g., freedom of contract) to the exclusion of the contextual social factors (e.g., 
education, social recognition, mutual respect, economic position) that gives 
those entities and relations substance and shape.  
Id. at 555. 
 283. 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (cases integrated). 
 284. Id. at 710-11. 
 285. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion accepted the proposition that diversity could 
be a compelling interest that might survive the strict scrutiny accorded to racial classifica-
tions, but wrote that the Seattle plan in particular was not “narrowly tailored to achieve its 
own ends.” Id. at 787, 723; see also Robert M. Ackerman, Community, Diversity, and Equal 
Protection: The Louisville and Seattle School Cases, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 937, 938 (2008) 
[hereinafter Ackerman, Equal Protection].  
 286. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 856. Phrased another way, Justice Breyer asked, 
“How could such a plan be lawful the day before dissolution [of a court’s desegregation 
order] but then become unlawful the very next day?” Id. at 821.  
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 The answer could apparently be found in a seemingly straightfor-
ward statement by the Chief Justice: “The way to stop discrimination 
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”287 
This statement, an unobjectionable truism on its face, captures the 
alluring formalism of Roberts’ rhetoric. It ignores, however, the reali-
ty of life in America 150 years after the abolition of slavery, a reality 
in which the racial divide permeates all too many aspects of Ameri-
can life, and all too often results in fewer opportunities for persons of 
color. To the formalist, there can be no wrong in rules that are racial-
ly “neutral” on their face, and nothing right about a rule that pro-
vides for differential treatment on the basis of race.288 To the commu-
nitarian, there remains much work to be done in order to achieve 
even a rough approximation of racial equality, and wide berth must 
be given to measures that promote equal, or at least nearly equal, 
participation in American life. It is very difficult to honestly rectify 
racial inequality without taking race into account.289 In some in-
stances, proxies (like the use of economic or geographic criteria or 
“individualized consideration”) may be acceptable ways to accomplish 
the goal of racial equality.290 But it is apparently verboten to call the 
                                                                                                                       
 287. Id. at 748. 
 288. Professor Winter explains that there is a “sense of formalism at work in the notion 
of formal equality,” and that “this notion of formalism is profoundly linked to individual-
ism.” Winter, supra note 281, at 553-54.  
 To be fair, Chief Justice Roberts appears to consistently view any racial criteria with 
suspicion, sometimes to benign effect. In Buck v. Davis, the Chief Justice determined that 
inviting testimony from an expert witness that a defendant was more likely to be a future 
danger because he was black strongly suggested ineffective assistance of counsel. 137 S. Ct. 
759, 780 (2017). In so doing, Chief Justice Roberts overcame a number of procedural (and 
formalistic) objections, leading Justice Thomas to begin his dissent with the words, 
“[h]aving settled on a desired outcome, the Court bulldozes procedural obstacles and mis-
applies settled law to justify it.” Id. at 780-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting). To the Chief Jus-
tice, however, this was a clear case of racial injustice: 
[O]ur holding on prejudice makes clear that Buck may have been sentenced to 
death in part because of his race. . . . [T]his is a disturbing departure from a 
basic premise of our criminal justice system: Our law punishes people for what 
they do, not who they are. Dispensing punishment on the basis of an immuta-
ble characteristic flatly contravenes this guiding principle. 
Id. at 778 (majority opinion). 
 289. See François, supra note 11, at 989-90.   
 290. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“[U]niversities cannot establish 
quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate 
admissions tracks. Nor can universities insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or 
ethnic groups from the competition for admission. Universities can, however, consider race 
or ethnicity more flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in the context of individualized consideration of 
each and every applicant.” (citations omitted)).  
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problem by its name—by explicitly using racial classifications to ad-
dress problems related to race.291  
 I do not mean to suggest that this is an easy case. Strict scrutiny 
may, in fact, be justified any time we take the extreme step of classi-
fying people by race, and the binary racial categories used by the 
school districts here were rather crude292 and even offensive. Chief 
Justice Roberts distinguished the Seattle and Jefferson County plans 
from the diversity plan upheld in law school admissions in Grutter v. 
Bollinger293 in part because the latter undertook a “highly individual-
ized, holistic review”294 employing “a far broader array of qualifica-
tions and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a sin-
gle though important element.”295 It is healthy to view students not 
simply in terms of a racial classification, but as multifaceted individ-
uals bearing a number of relevant characteristics.296 But the Court 
used a second reason to distinguish this case from Grutter—one that 
appears quite odd. The Chief Justice observed that in upholding the 
admission plan in Grutter, the Court had “relied upon considerations 
unique to institutions of higher education.”297 So, after segregating 
students for the first thirteen years of their education, it was now 
okay for public institutions to teach them to live in a diverse commu-
nity. Forgive us for thinking that the racial segregation students have 
endured during the early, formative parts of their educational careers 
have necessitated the affirmative action plans adopted by colleges and 
universities—an infirmity that democratically elected school boards in 
Seattle and Jefferson County were trying to address.298 
                                                                                                                       
 291. Professor Neil Siegel has suggested that Justice Kennedy’s “understanding of 
public education as an engine of interracial socialization and community counseled against 
barring almost all use of racial classifications, when it is presently uncertain whether 
communities can accomplish meaningful levels of racial integration without them.” Acker-
man, Equal Protection, supra note 285, at 943. 
 292. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at786 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment). 
 293. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 294. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337). 
 295. Id. at 722 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325). 
 296. “Despite notions to the contrary, there is only one human race. Our single race is 
independent of geographic origin, ethnicity, culture, color of skin or shape of eyes—we all 
share a single phenotype, the same or similar observable anatomical features and behav-
ior.” Michael Hadjiargyrou, Race is a Social Concept, Not a Scientific One, LIVE SCI. (Aug. 
29, 2014, 8:16 PM), http://www.livescience.com/47627-race-is-not-a-science-concept.html 
[https://perma.cc/P2YG-R6Q4]. 
 297. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724. 
 298. Justice Breyer noted, in his dissent, that “the Constitution permits local communi-
ties to adopt desegregation plans even where it does not require them to do so.” Id. at 803 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). To Professor Siegel, “a key question in Parents Involved was how 
the institution of public education in America[] should go about performing its formation 
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 Communitarians might suggest deference to the community val-
ues inherent in the Seattle and Jefferson County school boards’ inte-
gration plans. But we do so at some risk. The system of racial apart-
heid struck down in Brown v. Board of Education299 and its progeny 
was built on majoritarian rules based on a long-standing custom of 
the community. We might try to distinguish the Seattle and Jefferson 
County plans, as Professor Steven Winter does, based on their benign 
intent. “Classification by race was undertaken solely for the purpose 
of ameliorating racial isolation,” says Professor Winter.300 “The racial 
classification in Seattle, unlike the segregation at issue in Plessy and 
Brown, created no second-class citizens.”301 This justification was re-
jected, however, in the plurality opinion in Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke,302 another decision encumbered by legal for-
malism. What is a benign expression of community mores to some is 
outright discrimination to others. 
 The failure of Parents Involved lies in what Professor Winter calls 
Justice Roberts’s insistence “on equal protection as a radically indi-
vidualist right regardless of the social groups to which we belong and 
the impact and social consequences that flow from that sociological 
reality.”303 Professor François suggests an intriguing reformulation.304 
While acknowledging the long-standing scholarly debate between the 
primacy of the individual and the importance of group identity, Pro-
fessor François concedes that “it would not seem likely that the com-
munity will soon displace the individual at the heart of American 
constitutional jurisprudence.”305 But he remains steadfast in the as-
sertion that “the right to connect with members of a larger communi-
                                                                                                                  
function—that is, what the social mission of public education in America should be.” 
Ackerman, Equal Protection, supra note 285, at 943. 
 299. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 300. Winter, supra note 281, at 555. 
 301. Id. at 556. 
 302. 438 U.S. 265, 294 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[The University] urges us to adopt 
for the first time a more restrictive view of the Equal Protection Clause and hold that dis-
crimination against members of the white ‘majority’ cannot be suspect if its purpose can be 
characterized as ‘benign.’ The clock of our liberties, however, cannot be turned back to 
1868.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 492)); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. 
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“We are a Nation not of black and 
white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities knitted together by various tra-
ditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals.”). 
 303. Winter, supra note 281, at 555. 
 304. I had asked Professor François to speak and write for an AALS/Penn State Law 
Review symposium on Parents Involved after having been impressed with an amicus brief 
that he had written for the case, replete with communitarian themes. His resulting work, 
Only Connect, did not disappoint. See François, supra note 11. 
 305. François asserts, however, “[I]t is difficult to see how the liberal conception of the 
individual, however much it may have served as a robust intellectual foundation for a con-
stitutional jurisprudence of rights, actually resembles real people.” Id. at 1017. 
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ty is as deep and innate a part of human nature as the right to be left 
alone.”306 Most significantly, he states: 
[T]he right to community cannot be reduced to a desire to associate 
with those with whom one shares political, economic, or intellectu-
al interests, or with those to whom one is tied by cultural, reli-
gious, geographic, racial, or family, or even romantic bonds. Ra-
ther, the right to community is a right that expresses the human-
istic impulse to step outside of oneself and to move toward sympa-
thy and understanding of others different from oneself; it recogniz-
es not exclusionary associational ties but inclusionary community 
connections; it encourages social relations that weave tight bonds 
among diverse members of the group; it requires not a life cut 
down into associational fragments but one open to a communal 
whole; and above all, it flows not to the group but to the individual. 
It is, in short, an individual liberty right, not a communitarian 
group interest.307 
 This passage is an excellent distillation of what it means to be a 
communitarian in a republic that continues to repose great value in 
individual rights.308 It is of the same cloth as the Reverend Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King’s observation that “[w]e are caught in an inescapable 
network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever 
affects one directly, affects all indirectly.”309 This is the very essence 
of liberal communitarianism. We are all something less than we can 
potentially be due to the structural barriers society imposes on our 
ability to associate with people of different races, religions, and eth-
nicities. We seek membership and participation in a community eve-
ry bit as diverse as our multicultural society promises. The children 
of Seattle and Jefferson County―and vicariously their parents, 
friends, and neighbors―had a right to break the bonds of segregation 
(de jure or de facto) and associate with those who were different to 
overcome the constraints of insularity and be part of something larg-
er than themselves. They had, and we have, a right to community.  
F.   Empowering Intermediate Communities 
Our ultimate end must be the creation of the beloved community.310 
                                                                                                                       
 306. Id. at 1019. 
 307. Id.  
 308. I have previously noted “the irony that communitarian principles might find their 
legal expression only through the minting of a new ‘right.’ ” Ackerman, Equal Protection, 
supra note 285, at 942. 
 309. King Letter, supra note 96. 
 310. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Statement to the Press at the Beginning of the Youth 
Leadership Conference, Raleigh, North Carolina (Apr. 15, 1960). 
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 It is perhaps in the area of group rights where communitarians 
are most likely to part company with a traditionally liberal interpre-
tation of the Constitution. Whereas civil libertarians see the Consti-
tution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, as protecting individuals 
against the power of the state, communitarians are also likely to em-
brace opportunities to give full expression to group rights. That is 
why, for example, Citizens United’s recognition of First Amendment 
rights on the part of corporations and unions is not nearly as threat-
ening to communitarians as Buckley v. Valeo’s willingness to equate 
money with speech. While civil libertarians give at least lip service to 
freedom of association, critics of Citizens United may be slow to 
acknowledge what should be allowed to happen when people do, in 
fact, associate.  
 On the opposite side of the coin, we regard it as unfortunate that 
in Parents Involved, the Court failed to consider the communitarian 
gains to be realized through integration plans that promoted interra-
cial association or, what Professor François called “the right to com-
munity.”311 Among the goals articulated in the Constitution’s Pream-
ble are to “provide for the common defence, promote the general Wel-
fare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posteri-
ty.”312 Inherent in the Constitution was an effort by the Founders to 
reach out and build something larger than themselves. 
 That larger something necessarily had to include the instruments 
of civil society, i.e., voluntary associations (formal and informal) con-
structed by citizens to enhance their lives economically, socially, in-
tellectually, religiously, and culturally. Neither the individual nor the 
federal government could handle all tasks; intermediate communities 
were needed to perform most of the work necessary for society to 
function. The Constitution provides a structure conducive to these 
intermediate communities; indeed, inherent in the very idea of feder-
alism is the concept that some functions are best left to smaller gov-
ernmental units. Consistent with this concept, the Communitarian 
Platform provides: 
Generally, no social task should be assigned to an institution that 
is larger than necessary to do the job. What can be done by fami-
lies, should not be assigned to an intermediate group . . . . What 
can be done at the local level should not be passed on to the state 
or federal level . . . . There are, of course, plenty of urgent  
tasks . . . that do require national and even international action. 
                                                                                                                       
 311. François, supra note 11, at 1019. 
 312. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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But to remove tasks to higher levels than is necessary weakens the 
constituent communities.313 
 As the Communitarian Platform acknowledges, the most basic 
and intimate intermediate community is the family.314 The ability to 
form a family, a right assumed by most of us, was what same-sex 
couples fought for in Windsor v. United States315 and Obergefell v. 
Hodges.316 By supporting the formation of marriages in Windsor and 
Obergefell, the Court strengthened the intermediate community of 
the family and encouraged the formation of more stable environ-
ments for children.317 Few, if any, intermediate communities contrib-
ute more to a healthy society than stable and loving families. 
 But families alone do not make a community.318 Churches, syna-
gogues, mosques, neighborhood organizations, bowling leagues, profit 
and non-profit corporations, charitable organizations, advocacy 
groups, and a plethora of other institutions (formal and informal) are 
                                                                                                                       
 313. ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 19, at 260.  
 314. Communitarian Platform, supra note 7, at xxviii (“The best place to start is where 
each new generation acquires its moral anchoring: at home, in the family.”). 
 315. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). In Windsor, the Court invalidated a section of the Defense 
of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), defining “marriage” as a union between one 
man and one woman. DOMA had thereby ignored how eleven states had redefined the 
term and deprived members of same-sex marriages the benefits to which they would have 
been entitled under federal law. Said Justice Kennedy for the Court: 
[T]he State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred 
upon them a dignity and status of immense import. When the State used its 
historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in this way, its 
role and its power in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, 
and protection of the class in their own community. DOMA, because of its reach 
and extent, departs from this history and tradition of reliance on state law to 
define marriage.  
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. Ironically Obergefell, like DOMA, would deprive the state of 
the ability to define marriage in the same historical manner. 
 316. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). We have mentioned earlier how Obergefell is likely to be 
regarded as disturbing to conservative communitarians. See supra notes 109-12 and ac-
companying text. 
 317. The Michigan plaintiffs in Obergefell, April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, a lesbian 
couple, felt compelled to bring litigation because the state had denied them the right to 
adopt special-needs children. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub 
nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 318.  
Community is an essential human need. We cannot develop as individuals in 
isolation. Our first essential community is our family; for most of us, this re-
mains the foundational community of our lives. But to develop fully as individ-
uals, we have to establish a wider range of communities. This is both how we 
are drawn into the wider world as well as how we establish ourselves as auton-
omous individuals with an existence separate from our families. 
MAYER, supra note 24, at 240. 
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intermediate communities falling somewhere between the family and 
the state. It does take a village, not only to raise a child but to sup-
port a healthy, prosperous society. Professor Putnam says: 
Researchers in . . . education, urban poverty, unemployment, the 
control of crime and drug abuse, and even health have discovered 
that successful outcomes are more likely in civically engaged com-
munities. Similarly, research on the varying economic attainments 
of different ethnic groups in the United States has demonstrated 
the importance of social bonds within each group. . . . [R]esearch in 
a wide range of settings . . . demonstrates the vital importance of 
social networks for job placement and many other economic out-
comes.319  
 I must pause for a moment to acknowledge that intermediate 
communities can sometimes be sources of the type of invidious dis-
crimination that we discussed in the previous subsection. Much of 
civil rights law has derived from individuals and subordinated groups 
seeking protection from intermediate communities—most frequently 
the states, but sometimes corporations and other powerful organiza-
tions—through the federal government and its courts. For every 
community like Seattle and Jefferson County that tries to promote 
diversity and the building of bridging capital, there have been many 
more (including Jefferson County decades ago) that have insisted 
that community norms require barriers to integration and advance-
ment. Intermediate communities are not always benign, and even 
now, the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King’s vision of the Beloved 
Community is not within easy reach.320 
 While Citizens United, Hobby Lobby, Windsor, and Obergefell all 
extol the value of intermediate communities, at least two Roberts 
Court decisions—District of Columbia v. Heller and Harris v. 
Quinn—fail to adequately account for the role of intermediate com-
munities. In Heller, the Court declared, for the first time, that the 
Second Amendment guarantees “the individual right to possess and 
carry weapons in case of confrontation.”321 It is not as if a right to 
bear arms had never before been acknowledged (outside the language 
                                                                                                                       
 319. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DE-
MOCRACY 65, 66 (1995). 
 320. “The Beloved Community” is a term that was first coined in the early days of the 
twentieth century by the philosopher-theologian Josiah Royce, who founded the Fellowship 
of Reconciliation. The Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., also a member of the Fellow-
ship of Reconciliation, popularized the term. The King Philosophy, KING CTR., 
http://www.thekingcenter.org/king-philosophy [https://perma.cc/Q5UF-D2VL] (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2018). 
 321. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). 
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of the Second Amendment) in the individual context.322 But the Court 
chose this occasion to read an individual right into the Constitution. 
On previous occasions, the Court had declined to do so,323 and the 
plain language of the Second Amendment supports this view.324  
 Verbal gymnastics aside, the most reasonable approximation to 
the truth is that it was very difficult to separate individual weapons 
ownership from militia membership at the time of the Bill of Rights’ 
adoption; individual citizens, who routinely used their firearms for 
hunting and occasionally for self-defense, brought their guns to mili-
tia meetings and did not seem to give much thought to the different 
capacities in which they were used.325 But this is of little import in 
modern society. The question is not how the Second Amendment 
played out in 1791; the question is how we can best apply its lan-
guage to the reality of the modern world, in which gun violence and 
its prevention are very legitimate concerns. The Communitarian 
Platform attempts to resolve the controversy in a single sentence: 
“We join with those who read the Second Amendment the way it was 
written, as a communitarian clause, calling for community militias, 
not individual gun slingers.”326 That is nice, but it, too, fails to take 
into account the legitimate private uses of firearms (from hunting to 
self-defense), the palpable fear of those living in violence-raked com-
munities,327 and the debate as to whether widespread firearms own-
ership makes us safer or places us in greater peril.  
 Writing for the majority in Heller, Justice Scalia acknowledged, 
“We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this  
                                                                                                                       
 322. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion cites several state constitutions as sources of this 
right, id. at 584-85, 601-03, along with post-Civil War discourse about the rights of freed 
blacks, id. at 616.  
 323. E.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1975); United States v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
 324. Lest anyone forget, the Second Amendment somewhat clumsily reads: “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. The majority opinion 
of Justice Scalia, see, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 577, and the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Stevens, see id. at 637, 676, joust mightily over the meaning of this language. For a more 
amusing but nevertheless insightful analysis, see Steven L. Winter, Confident, but Still 
Not Positive, 25 CONN. L. REV. 893, 915 (1993). 
 325. See Allison L. Mollenhauer, Note, Shot Down!: The D.C. Circuit Disarms Gun 
Control Laws in Parker v. District of Columbia, 53 VILL. L. REV. 353, 360 (2008) (“Early 
Americans understood the right as permitting private uses of guns, including hunting, 
defending against attacks by individuals and resisting a tyrannical government, in addi-
tion to any militia service the state required of an individual.”). 
 326. Communitarian Platform, supra note 7, at xxxv (emphasis omitted).  
 327. Detroit’s police chief has parted company from most of his peers by encouraging 
citizens to arm themselves against crime. Drew Zahn, Detroit Police Chief to Citizens: Arm 
Yourselves, WND (Jan. 3, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2014/01/detroit-police-chief-
to-citizens-arm-yourselves/ [https://perma.cc/DD6B-C8VL]. 
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country . . . . But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessari-
ly takes certain policy choices off the table.”328 Justice Stevens aptly 
responded, “[T]he right the Court announces was not ‘enshrined’ in 
the Second Amendment by the Framers; it is the product of today’s 
law-changing decision.”329 For communitarians, this gets to the crux 
of the matter. A proper balance might have been struck by deferring 
to the legislative process; a process more conducive to a weighing of 
complex considerations than a sweeping judicial declaration. Instead, 
a law tailored to an “urban crime problem in that it is local in scope”330 
was struck down in favor of a newly minted constitutional right. 
 The Court did assure us that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured 
by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”331 Subsequent decisions 
of lower courts have determined that the Second Amendment does 
not preclude the states or federal government from banning military-
style semi-automatic weapons332 or forbidding convicted felons from 
possessing firearms.333 But the Court’s discovery of an individual 
right under the Constitution, where prior decisions had recognized 
only a community right, remains disturbing to communitarians. 
 Equally disturbing is the far less publicized case of Harris v. 
Quinn.334 In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,335 the Burger Court 
had upheld the widespread practice of charging nonunion members a 
“fair share” agency fee to compensate labor unions for providing rep-
resentation in collective bargaining and grievance proceedings. But 
in Harris, the Roberts Court held that the collection of agency fees 
(even if they did not directly finance the union’s political activities) 
violated dissenting workers’ First Amendment rights.336 The Court 
                                                                                                                       
 328. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
 329. Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 330. Id. at 682 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer went on to say: 
[T]he law imposes a burden upon gun owners that seems proportionately no 
greater than restrictions in existence at the time the Second Amendment was 
adopted. In these circumstances, the District’s law falls within the zone that 
the Second Amendment leaves open to regulation by legislatures.  
Id. 
 331. Id. at 626 (majority opinion). 
 332. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding state law banning 
assault weapons and large-capacity magazines does not violate the Second Amendment). 
 333. See, e.g., United States. v. Gieswein, 346 Fed. App’x 293 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 334. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). Harris was announced on the same day as Hobby Lobby, to 
far less fanfare and criticism.  
 335. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 336. The plaintiffs were employed as home-care personal assistants who were hired by 
the recipients of care but whose salaries were paid by the state. Justice Alito’s opinion 
stopped just short of overturning Abood, finding that the Harris plaintiffs were not public 
employees in the strict sense. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644. Justice Kagan, dissenting, 
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reasoned that when a union engages in collective bargaining with a 
public entity, it necessarily engages in political speech, such that any 
attempt to segregate political from nonpolitical funds is unavailing.337  
 The Harris decision was followed one year later by argument of 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,338 in which the Court 
was invited to overturn Abood in its entirety. Judging by the oral ar-
gument in Friedrichs, this would almost certainly have come to pass 
but for Justice Scalia’s untimely death.339 The resulting 4-4 tie left 
Abood at least temporarily in place.340 
 As it stands, the Harris decision is a shocking abandonment of the 
communitarian norms that underlie American labor law. That law, 
most notably through the National Labor Relations Act,341 was de-
signed to level the playing field in labor-management relations by 
providing for industrial democracy.342 Unions were allowed to organ-
ize the workforce, and if they could obtain the support of the majority 
of the workers in a given shop (the “bargaining unit”), they had a 
right—in fact, an obligation—to represent all of the workers in collec-
tive bargaining and grievance procedures.343 The law did not oblige all 
workers represented by the union to become members of the union, but 
                                                                                                                  
thought this was a distinction without a difference. Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see 
also Ackerman & Cole, supra note 18, at 989 n.431.  
 337. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (saying that it is conceptually difficult to distinguish, in 
public-sector cases, between union expenditures made for collective-bargaining purposes 
and those made to achieve political ends). Additionally, the Court reasoned that speech 
cannot be restricted because public employees’ salaries and conditions of employment are 
matters of public concern. Id. at 2642-43. If this was true in a case involving home-care 
workers receiving salaries from the state, it could be no less true of people working directly 
for and paid by the state or a local school district, as would be the case in Friedrichs v. 
California Teachers Association. 
 338. 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015).  
 339. See Transcript of Oral Argument at, Friedrichs, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (No. 14-915). The 
Court is again considering the issue of the agency shop in Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, 
851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017), argued Feb. 26, 2018. The 
Court recently heard arguments on February 26, 2018. 
 340. See Friedrichs, 135 S. Ct. at 2933. 
 341. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1935) (popularly known as the “NLRA” or “Wagner Act”). 
Technically speaking, the NLRA applied to neither the Harris nor Friedrichs scenarios, as 
it leaves to the states the law as to employees of state and local government. 
 342. In Citizens United, the Court (perhaps naively) assured us that “corporate democ-
racy” would sufficiently protect the interests of dissenting shareholders. Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
794 (1978)). Lance Cole and I have offered an extensive critique of this rationale. See 
Ackerman & Cole, supra note 18, at 931-47. Certainly, dissenting members of a bargaining 
unit have far more opportunity to express their dissent and vote the union out than do 
corporate shareholders with respect to corporate management. 
 343. 14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 256 (2009) (“[The] broad authority [of a 
union] ‘is accompanied by a responsibility of equal scope, the responsibility and duty of fair 
representation.’ ” (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964)). 
128  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:59 
 
they were (in the absence of a so-called “right to work” law344) required 
to pay an agency fee in return for the union’s obligation to provide “full 
and fair representation” to all members of the bargaining unit.345  
 Extension of the Harris rationale to all public employees would 
forsake the principle of industrial democracy in favor of a far less 
useful “right” to abandon one’s co-workers. Granted, home-care per-
sonal assistants may not feel the same sense of solidarity as those 
working in the same public school or municipal office. We neverthe-
less have reason to hold our collective breath now that a Friedrichs-
type case has found its way to a Supreme Court in which Justice 
Gorsuch has succeeded Justice Scalia.346 Abandonment of Abood 
would enshrine “right-to-work” as constitutional doctrine with re-
spect to public employees. The “right” of workers to be represented 
without having to pay the freight would produce a freeloader effect, 
crippling unions much as it has in many so-called “right-to-work” 
states.347 Workers would obtain small First Amendment coin in ex-
                                                                                                                       
 344. The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1947), also known as 
the Taft-Hartley Act, allowed states to enact “right-to-work” laws, which prohibited the 
charging of even an agency fee to nonunion members. The use of the term “right-to-work” 
has been a triumph of anti-union propaganda and the myth of rugged individualism. No 
collective bargaining agreement prevents anyone from working or compels workers to join 
a union. Id. § 164(b). The agency fee arrangement simply requires represented employees 
to pay their fair share (an amount somewhat lower than full union dues) in return for rep-
resentation. What has been called the “right-to-work” is really the “right” to freeload. 
 345. For the duty of representation owed by unions to nonmember employees in the 
bargaining unit, see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (holding 
that unions have a duty to represent, in good faith, all employees in the bargaining unit). 
One hitch here: In many instances, only union members are permitted to vote on ratifica-
tion of collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Williams v. Pub. Employment Relations 
Bd., 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 618, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding determination by state 
agency that denying non-member employees the right to vote in union elections was not an 
unfair labor practice); Penn. Labor Relations Bd. v. E. Lancaster Cty. Educ. Ass’n., 427 
A.2d 305, 309 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (holding that exclusion of nonmember employees 
from union elections did not violate the union’s duty of fair representation). But see Branch 
6000 Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding 
NLRB ruling that barring nonmembers from voting on a referendum concerning the terms 
and conditions of employment was an unfair labor practice). That nonunion members of the 
bargaining unit might be excluded from voting on the contract under which they will be 
bound is quite troubling, if we are truly concerned about industrial democracy.  
 346. See Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 
S. Ct. 54 (2017), argued Feb. 26, 2018. 
 347. See BUREAU OF LABOR EDUC., UNIV. OF ME., THE TRUTH ABOUT “RIGHT TO  
WORK” LAWS, at tbl. 1 (2011), https://umaine.edu/ble/wp-content/uploads/sites/181/2011/04/ 
RighttoWork_Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK3A-SQJH]. (reporting that as of 2007, the av-
erage percentage of union representation in “right-to-work” states is 6.6%, compared to 
15.1% in “free-bargaining” states). “Right-to-work” has contributed to the shocking decline 
in union representation of the work force. See Alexia Fernández Campbell, One Reason the 
Rust Belt Turned Red, ATLANTIC (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2016/11/one-reason-the-rust-belt-turned-red/507611/ [https://perma.cc/UDT3-LRHL] 
(noting that after Michigan passed a right-to-work law in 2012, union membership fell 
11&, and that similar results occurred after Wisconsin passed a right-to-work law in 2015); 
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change for the loss of effective union representation, and the concept 
of community would suffer a critical blow.348 Whither solidarity? 
G.   Transcending the Impulse to Reduce Every Problem  
to a Binary Choice 
Principle without compromise is empty; compromise without 
 principle is blind.349 
 The tendency to see most everything in binary terms plagues phil-
osophical commentary, political controversies, and legal disputes. Too 
often, commentators see communitarianism in opposition to liberal-
ism, when in fact communitarians like Etzioni, Glendon, and Putnam 
advocate for a “third way” through which people of many political 
stripes might forge consensus based on commonly held values. Too 
many controversies before the Supreme Court are depicted as clashes 
between “liberals” and “conservatives,” “libertarians” and “authori-
tarians,” or as pitting civil liberties against state power. 
 Of course, our adversarial system contributes to this. The “v” that 
separates litigants is conducive to an “us” versus “them” mentality, 
even in areas lending themselves to mutual accommodation. While 
lower courts may press parties to explore negotiated and mediated 
solutions to problems, by the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, 
the issues have been honed and the knives have been sharpened. Ap-
pointments to the Supreme Court have similarly taken on a bitter, 
adversarial tone.350 The quest for fair, competent, and impartial jurists 
                                                                                                                  
see also Jake Rosenfeld, Patrick Denice & Jennifer Laird, Union Decline Lowers Wages of 
Nonunion Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.epi.org/publication/ 
union-decline-lowers-wages-of-nonunion-workers-the-overlooked-reason-why-wages-are-
stuck-and-inequality-is-growing/ [https://perma.cc/ZSR7-KQTS] (“The great organizing 
drives that began after congressional passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
of 1935 resulted in the unionization of more than 1 of every 3 private-sector workers by the 
1950s. Today, that fraction has fallen to approximately 1 of 20 private-sector workers—the 
lowest rate in over a century.”)  
 348. See PUTNAM, supra note 9, at 81-83 (lamenting the decline of unions and its effect 
on social capital).  
 349. Stephen B. Smith, A Lincoln for Our Time, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/books/review/lincolns-tragic-pragmatism-by-john-
burt.html?mcubz=3 (reviewing JOHN BURT, LINCOLN’S TRAGIC PRAGMATISM: LINCOLN, 
DOUGLAS, AND MORAL CONFLICT (2012)). 
 350. The bitterness may have reached its peak in 2016, when a Republican Senate 
refused to even conduct hearings on the Supreme Court nominee of a Democratic president 
who had eleven months remaining in his term. Republicans would charge, however, that 
the recriminations began with the Democrats’ opposition to the nomination of Robert Bork 
for the Court in 1987. James Robertson, The Judicial Nomination War Started with Bork. 
Let’s End It with Gorsuch, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/the-judicial-nomination-war-started-with-bork-lets-end-it-with-gorsuch/2017/03/ 
15/3effeb4e-0990-11e7-b77c-0047d15a24e0_story.html?utm_term=.4a74ebc53671.   
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has devolved into a litmus test of whether a judicial nominee will vote 
to overturn Roe v. Wade or Citizens United (pick your poison). 
 This adversarial phenomenon has certainly been exacerbated by 
the excessive partisanship that pervades present-day American poli-
tics. But our insistence on “rights talk” is responsible as well. Profes-
sor Mary Ann Glendon has suggested: 
[T]he prominence of a certain kind of rights talk in our political 
discussions is both a symptom of, and a contributing factor to, this 
disorder in the body politic. . . .  
. . . [R]ights talk encourages our all-too-human tendency to place 
the self at the center of our moral universe. . . . [I]t regularly pro-
motes the short-run over the long-term, crisis intervention over 
preventive measures, and particular interests over the common 
good.351  
Glendon further notes, “Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes 
unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dia-
logue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least 
the discovery of common ground.”352 
 We might alleviate this state of affairs by ceasing to regard every 
problem as a binary choice. In his recent book, The Conflict Paradox, 
Bernard Mayer posits that conflict is unnecessarily exacerbated 
when we insist on seeing disputes in “either/or” terms. Mayer ex-
plains that “conflict promotes less complex thinking―and simpler 
thinking promotes conflict.”353 Therefore, our first challenge “is to 
make sure we are not swept into a more primitive and polarized way 
of thinking.”354 Mayer sets forth seven “key polarities” that often 
stymie efforts to resolve conflict: (1) competition and cooperation; (2) 
optimism and realism; (3) avoidance and engagement; (4) principle 
and compromise; (5) emotions and logic; (6) neutrality and advocacy; 
and (7) community and autonomy.355 Of these, the fourth (principle 
and compromise) and seventh (community and autonomy) are the 
most conducive to a better understanding of how a communitarian out-
look can promote creative and useful constitutional decisionmaking.  
 Mayer observes that community and autonomy are far from polar 
opposites. To the contrary, “[c]ommunity and autonomy are not only 
wrapped up in each other, but one requires the other. We establish 
our independence by having a healthy attachment to others, and we 
                                                                                                                       
 351. GLENDON, supra note 4, at x-xi. 
 352. Id. at 14. 
 353. MAYER, supra note 24, at 14 (capitalization omitted). 
 354. Id. at 16. 
 355. See id.  
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can become truly autonomous only if we have a healthy network of 
social relationships.”356  
 We discussed earlier how strong bonding social capital is condu-
cive to the building of bridging social capital. In like manner, healthy 
communities nurture autonomous individuals, and confident individ-
uals are most likely to contribute to vibrant communities. Even the 
Tea Party movement, which stresses the importance of individual 
rights and autonomy, has enjoyed at least a modicum of success be-
cause individuals banded together to back a political cause.357 Ameri-
ca is a free and prosperous country because we have usually been 
able to strike a balance between individual initiative and the public 
interest.358 Cases make their way to the Supreme Court because some-
times we need an ultimate decider as to where that balance should be 
struck. If the answer is clear-cut, we should be able to figure it out on 
our own without resorting to the nation’s ultimate arbiter.  
 It is therefore not surprising that the Court often appears polar-
ized, replicating the sharp divisions in our country. This is not alto-
gether unhealthy. As Mayer notes, “Communities need to find a way 
for members to raise important issues with each other, or the vitality 
of the community will diminish.”359 Indeed, “[r]esort to the courts, as 
grueling and disruptive as it may be, is an affirmation of the commu-
nity’s rules, mores, and its very legitimacy.”360 And the appearance of 
sharp divisions on the Court can be deceptive. Approximately half of 
                                                                                                                       
 356. Id. at 248. 
 357. There is evidence that the Tea Party was a product of “Astroturfing”—i.e., a few 
individuals promoting their politics by establishing what looked like a grass roots move-
ment from the top down. Jeff Nesbit, The Secret Origins of the Tea Party, TIME (Apr. 5, 
2016), http://time.com/secret-origins-of-the-tea-party/ [https://perma.cc/LG8B-7GT8]. But 
few popular movements are able to sustain themselves without some leadership at the top: 
a Washington, a Lenin, a Mandela. Where such leadership is lacking, we see ineffectual 
movements like Occupy Wall Street. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Occupy Wall Street: A Frenzy 
That Fizzled, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/occupy-
wall-street-a-frenzy-that-fizzled/?_r=0.  
 358. There are those, Senator Bernie Sanders among them, who would claim that cer-
tain intermediate communities (corporations, for the most part) have obtained the upper 
hand and have created an unhealthy imbalance. Hence the call for “revolution.” Kelly Rid-
dell, Sanders Calls For ‘Political Revolution’ So He Can Deliver on Policy Proposals, WASH. 
TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/3/bernie-sanders-
calls-political-revolution-make-goo/ [https://perma.cc/YPE2-344Q]. 
 359. MAYER, supra note 24, at 263. That is why it is so dangerous for a presidential 
candidate to use a federal judge’s ethnicity to question his impartiality. See Brent Kendall, 
Trump Says Judge’s Mexican Heritage Presents ‘Absolute Conflict’, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-up-attacks-on-judge-gonzalo-curiel-
1464911442. Or, after his inauguration as president, to refer to a member of the judiciary 
as a “so-called judge.” Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4,  
2017, 5:12 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827867311054974976?lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/XXN4-7RAT]. 
 360. Ackerman, Disputing Together, supra note 12, at 59. 
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the cases decided by the Supreme Court result in unanimous or near-
unanimous decisions.361 The 5-4 and 6-3 decisions are not so infre-
quent as to be called aberrant, but they nonetheless appear in a mi-
nority of cases. Not unexpectedly, we direct our attention to these 
cases because they are the ones in which competing viewpoints come 
most sharply into focus. But there is apparently more consensus on 
the Court than most Americans are led to believe.  
 Even in some of the more controversial cases, the possibility of 
integrative solutions that accommodate essential interests has not 
always eluded the Court. The national security cases discussed earli-
er in this Article362 represent instances in which the Court recognized 
essential civil liberties without compromising national security. The 
“least restrictive alternative” doctrine, frequently applied in First 
Amendment cases363 and occasionally in other realms,364 encourages 
government at all levels to pursue a course of action that promotes 
legitimate state interests while preserving individual rights to the 
fullest extent possible. Regulatory schemes are struck down only if 
they place an “undue burden” on constitutional rights; this practice 
acts in a similar manner.365 
 Occasionally, the Court can recognize opportunities for the parties 
themselves to stand on principle without compromising essential 
values, i.e., opportunities to overcome Mayer’s fourth polarity prob-
lem. In Hobby Lobby,366 the Court held that employers with religious 
objections could not be required to provide certain contraceptive cov-
erage under the Affordable Care Act. Thereafter, federal regulations 
required employers to cover these contraceptives as part of their 
health plans, unless they submitted a form either to their insurer or 
to the federal government stating that they objected on religious 
grounds. In Zubik v. Burwell,367 the petitioners alleged that even 
submitting this form substantially burdened the exercise of their re-
                                                                                                                       
 361. The data for the October 2015 term is representative. Out of 75 decided cases, “36 
were unanimous, nine were 8-1 or 7-1, 19 were 6-3 or 6-2, and only 11 were decided by one 
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ligion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.368 The 
Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing addressing “whether 
contraceptive coverage could be provided to petitioners’ employees, 
through petitioners’ insurance companies, without any such notice 
from petitioners.”369  
 The employer-petitioners and the government confirmed that such 
an option was in fact feasible. The employers clarified that their reli-
gious exercise was not infringed where they “need to do nothing more 
than contract for a plan that does not include coverage for some or all 
forms of contraception,” even if their employees received cost-free 
contraceptive coverage from the same insurance company.370 The 
government confirmed that the challenged procedures “could be mod-
ified to operate in the manner posited in the Court’s order while still 
ensuring that the affected women receive contraceptive coverage 
seamlessly, together with the rest of their health coverage.”371  
 The Court, therefore, remanded the case, affording the parties “an 
opportunity to arrive at an approach . . . that accommodates petition-
ers’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women 
covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health 
coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’ ”372 Several federal dis-
trict courts and four circuit courts had issued inconsistent orders on 
the matter; apparently, it was not until the case reached the nation’s 
highest court that a principled compromise was encouraged. 
 James Madison, who receives much of the credit for the system of 
checks and balances on which we depend, nonetheless regarded the 
Constitution as only the starting point for collective discussion and 
compromise.373 Opportunities for the Supreme Court to promote prin-
cipled compromise, as in Zubik, are few and far between; integrative 
solutions (or at least compromise) are more likely obtained earlier in 
litigation, or―through the political processes―more commonly em-
ployed in the legislative and executive branches of government. That 
is why we would like to see a little more deference on the part of the 
Court to carefully calibrated solutions in which the legislative pro-
cess is used to accommodate a variety of interests.374 Hence, kudos to 
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Sebelius (or at least its outcome); less enthusiasm for Parents In-
volved, Citizens United, Heller, and Harris. 
IV.   CONCLUSION: THE CENTER MUST HOLD 
We are greater than the sum of our individual ambitions, and we 
remain more than a collection of red states and blue states. We are 
and forever will be the United States of America.375 
 We live in a racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse country. 
Political divisions are now so deep and so harsh that many Ameri-
cans have difficulty speaking to one another. There is a sacred text—
the Constitution—to which almost all of us subscribe, although we 
are divided, too, as to precisely what that text means. The United 
States Supreme Court stands as the ultimate arbiter and interpreter 
of that text. In a community of communities, it is the Court’s role to 
articulate and explain the secular values embodied in the Constitu-
tion, while both differentiating and maintaining respect for the sec-
tarian values espoused by many intermediate communities. 
 The Court is not and cannot be entirely divorced from politics. But 
lifetime tenure makes the judiciary the least political of the three 
branches of government. Unlike the other branches, it is not directly 
answerable to the popular will, and the political sympathies with 
which most Justices arrive at the Court tend to mellow over time. 
The Court functions as a micro-community within the intermediate 
community that we call the legal profession. That profession has its 
own rules and practices that create bonding and ultimately bridging 
social capital. I have said elsewhere: 
Litigation may be combat, but it is orderly combat, involving rules 
of engagement. These rules require a degree of collaboration, even 
among adversaries. . . . Brother and sister lawyers, though adver-
saries in litigation, speak a common language, follow a common set 
of rules . . . attend the same meetings, dine at the same table. The 
bonding social capital thereby generated enables them to jointly 
encounter and resolve the many small difficulties encountered in 
the course of litigation. Cooperation . . .  creates strands of social 
capital that enable attorneys to explore potential agreement re-
garding the “big things.376 
 So it is with the Supreme Court. The very manner in which the 
Court goes about its business is important to the building of strong 
social capital within American society as a whole. As the ultimate 
arbiter of constitutional rights and the limits of government power, 
the Court cannot allow itself to get swept into the partisan fray. 
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“Like a molecular bond, each conflict represents a strand of social 
capital that is either torn or repaired, depending on not just the re-
sult, but the process utilized for its resolution.”377 No matter how 
deep their philosophical differences, members of the Court need not 
and do not replicate the divisions of the more political branches; they 
indeed try not to behave as if they are in two armed camps.378  
 The deep personal friendship between Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg and the late Justice Antonin Scalia was a healthy reminder of 
this. Of more substance was William H. Rehnquist’s moderating in-
fluence after his elevation to the Chief Justice’s seat, and prior to 
then, Chief Justice Earl Warren’s efforts to maintain unanimity in 
the Court’s school desegregation decisions.379 We have yet to see 
whether Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Sebelius was a genuine ef-
fort to find common ground or just an idiosyncratic gesture that tem-
porarily spared an Obama Administration initiative. But we can hope 
that like some of his predecessors, the Chief Justice will help define 
and build a broad consensus regarding our essential values. The cen-
ter must hold. 
 Mayer observes, “[C]onflict work is in large part about helping 
build and maintain a sense of community in a world in which many 
forces are trying to atomize us and disrupt the functioning of the 
natural communities in which we live.”380 The Supreme Court is the 
ultimate micro-community of conflict professionals. It has our undi-
vided attention, and cannot help but act in a manner befitting our 
nation’s legal (and in some respects) social arbiter. 
 Professor Geoffrey Hazard has wisely noted: 
The concept of communitarian ethics . . . reminds us that serious 
questions of right and wrong cannot coherently be considered 
apart from community, defined somehow. It also reminds us of the 
many and various connections we have with our fellow human be-
ings. We are each members of many communities, have many 
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roles, and face many and inconsistent expectations as to what our 
“practices” should be.381 
 Justice Anthony Kennedy, sitting at the Court’s ideological center, 
is often called upon to articulate our values in the midst of conflict. 
He is thereby subject to the many and inconsistent expectations of 
the legal profession and the American public. While one may some-
times disagree with his reasoning, no one can question either his de-
votion to the nation or his appreciation of community. And so, it is 
Justice Kennedy’s closing passage in Obergefell to which we return: 
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the 
highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In 
forming a marital union, two people become something greater 
than once they were. . . . It would misunderstand these men and 
women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is 
that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find 
its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to 
live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institu-
tions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Consti-
tution grants them that right.382 
 Ours is not a country that allows or expects the government, on 
any level, to do everything for us. But neither are we a country in 
which we each lurch around as free agents, doing whatever suits us. 
None of us wish to be condemned to loneliness. Instead, more often 
than not, we seek out intermediate communities—the institutions of 
civil society—to give life to our aspirations. The family is the most 
basic unit of community. For the Supreme Court to recognize an ex-
pansive view of the family, as it has in Obergefell, is cause for hope that 
it will give due regard to community as we face an uncertain future. 
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